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"You're Fired! And Don't Forget Your Non-Compete..
The Enforceability of Restrictive Covenants in
Involuntary Discharge Cases
Kenneth J. Vanko'
I. INTRODUCTION
Employment contracts that contain restrictive covenants rarely con-
dition their enforceability on the method of separation. Indeed, most
contracts are highly pro-employer, such that a covenant not to com-
pete purports to take effect upon resignation or termination for any
reason whatsoever. Most employers who seek to include a restrictive
covenant in an employment agreement do so to prevent the unex-
pected resignation of a key executive or salesperson and the subse-
quent formation of a competing entity, which would be able to take
advantage of client relationships or business know-how gained at the
employer's expense. On the other hand, the vast majority of employ-
ers give comparatively less thought to the enforceability of the cove-
nant in cases involving discharge, as opposed to those involving
resignation. Initially, an employer may underestimate the threat a de-
parted employee poses and may not realize the extent to which its
client base or goodwill is threatened until the ex-employee starts com-
peting. Because employment agreements are normally drafted in the
employer's favor, a company official may examine the contract and
believe that the covenant is enforceable against a discharged em-
ployee regardless of how the working relationship ended. The analy-
sis, however, is not that simple. Strict considerations of fairness
suggest that it is antithetical to allow an employer to terminate an
employee and prevent him from working in his chosen profession.
Moreover, the courts' traditional reluctance to enforce restrictive cov-
enants,2 in conjunction with the value that our society places on the
free mobility of employees, 3 would seem to compel a court to invali-
1. Mr. Vanko is an associate attorney at the law firm of Clingen, Callow, Wolfe & McLean,
LLC in Wheaton, Illinois. He concentrates his practice in the areas of commercial litigation and
employment law.
2. See Huntington Eye Assoc., Inc. v. LoCascio, 553 S.E.2d 773, 780 (W. Va. 2001) (stating
that covenant is void on its face if it "appears designed to intimidate employees rather than
protect the employer's business").
3. See infra Part III.
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date a covenant in an involuntary discharge case. However, courts
have not established any clear rules to provide judges, lawyers and
parties with guidance in termination cases. The law in this area is rela-
tively undeveloped, perhaps because so few termination cases have
made their way through the reported decisions or the courts have not
given them much reasoned analysis. Nevertheless, given the prolifera-
tion of restrictive covenants, especially considering en masse lay-offs
and the fallout in the high-tech industry,4 these issues are likely to
arise with greater frequency, and the different approaches that courts
have used are just as likely to confound litigants.
Following Part II, a brief overview of the law concerning restrictive
covenants, Parts III.A., III.B., and III.C. analyze the current ap-
proaches courts have utilized in judging the enforceability of cove-
nants in the involuntary termination context. Part III.D. explores how
restrictive covenants have been addressed in other non-traditional
employment separations, such as the expiration of an employment
term contract, constructive discharge, and assignment of the contract
to a business purchaser. Parts IV and V conclude with some practical
advice for avoiding a costly legal dispute when an employer seeks to
bind a discharged worker to a covenant not to compete.
II. BACKGROUND
While nineteen states regulate restrictive covenants by statute, the
rest do so by common law.5 In the employee context, restrictive cove-
nants generally span four different areas: (1) general non-competition;
(2) customer (or client) non-solicitation; (3) employee non-solicita-
tion; and (4) non-disclosure. A brief overview of the general rules
with respect to each type of covenant follows.
4. See William Lynch Schaller, Jumping Ship: Legal Issues Relating to Employee Mobility in
High Tech. Indus., 17 LAB. LAW 25 (Summer 2001) (providing an excellent discussion of restric-
tive covenants in the information technology industry).
5. See ALA. CODE § 8-1-1 (2001); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2002); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § § 8-2-113(2), 8-2-113(3) (West 2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335 (West
2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-2.1 (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 480-4(c)(4) (Michie 2001);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (West 2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.772 (West 2002);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 (West 2002); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. 613.200 (Michie 2002); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 75-4 (2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 217
(West 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 53-9-11 (Michie 2002);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-101 (2002); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § § 15.50-52 (Vernon
2002); W. VA. CODE § 47-18-3(a) (2002); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 103.465 (West 2002).
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A. Non-Competition Clauses
Non-competition clauses seek to restrict an employee from working
for a competitor upon departure and are carefully scrutinized by
courts. Although the precise tests for governing the validity of a non-
compete covenant vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, most states
have adopted a modified version of Section 187 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts and require that non-competition clauses be:
(1) ancillary to a valid contract; (2) necessary to protect an employer's
legitimate business interest; and (3) reasonable in terms of activity,
duration and geographic scope.6
The doctrine of ancillarity is often met with ease, especially if the
employee executes the restrictive covenant at the inception of the em-
ployment relationship, or upon a change in the employee's status,
such as a promotion or significant pay raise.7 Litigation on the ancil-
larity requirement frequently involves an employer's attempt to bind a
current employee to a non-compete at some midpoint during the
course of his employment, often threatening discharge if the employee
refuses to cooperate.8 Most states hold that, for at-will employees,
continued employment constitutes sufficient consideration for the ex-
ecution of a restrictive covenant, 9 although the reasoning varies
among jurisdictions. 10 However, a minority of states, such as South
6. BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1223 (N.Y. 1999); Ellis v. James V. Hurson
Assoc., Inc., 565 A.2d 615, 618-19 (D.C. 1989); Sidco Paper Co v. Aaron, 351 A.2d 250, 252 (Pa.
1976); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 15.50(a) (Vernon 2002).
7. See Jostens, Inc. v. Nat'l Computer Sys., Inc., 318 N.W.2d 691, 703-04 (Minn. 1982) (holding
that non-compete agreements lacked consideration because employer did not provide employ-
ees with future benefits, raises or promotions).
8. Comment "b" to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 187 provides, in part: "A prom-
ise made subsequent to the transaction or relationship is not ancillary to it. In the case of a
continuing transaction or relationship, however, it is enough if the promise is made before its
termination, as long as it is supported by consideration and meets the other requirements of
enforceability." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 187 cmt. b (1979). Cf. Tatge v.
Chambers & Owen, Inc., 579 N.W.2d 217, 223-24 (Wis. 1998) (refusing to recognize cause of
action for wrongful discharge based on employer's termination of employee for refusing to sign
non-competition and non-disclosure agreement); Madden v. Omega Optical, Inc., 683 A.2d 386,
391 (Vt. 1996) (refusing to recognize cause of action for wrongful discharge based on employer's
termination of employee for refusing to sign Confidentiality, Disclosure, and Noncompetition
Agreement).
9. See Computer Sales Int'l, Inc. v. Collins, 723 S.W.2d 450, 452 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (holding
continued employment is sufficient consideration for execution of restrictive covenant by at-will
employee).
10. See Mattison v. Johnston, 730 P.2d 286, 290 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that employee's
continued employment for a period of almost three months constituted sufficient consideration
for execution of non-compete clause where employee terminated relationship); Cent. Adjust-
ment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 35 (Tenn. 1984) (holding whether consideration
exists is a function of the length of employment following execution of restrictive covenant and
the circumstances of the discharge); Thomas v. Coastal Indus. Servs., Inc., 108 S.E.2d 328, 329
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Carolina and North Carolina, disagree and hold that other considera-
tion must be provided to an at-will employee, rather than just contin-
ued employment." A valid non-compete clause can be ancillary to
other types of agreements, such as independent contractor agree-
ments,12 change-of-control agreements, 13 shareholder agreements,' 4
settlement agreements,' 5 lease agreements,' 6 or as part of the sale of a
business.' 7 The ancillarity doctrine is more closely scrutinized in the
traditional employment relationship, since the employee normally
lacks bargaining power that may be present in these other business
transactions. Non-compete litigation often focuses on whether the
former employer is seeking to protect a legitimate business interest by
restraining the departed employee from working in a similar position
for a competitor."' It is widely agreed that "[a] covenant not to com-
pete cannot be used to prevent competition per se;" rather, an em-
ployer must seek to protect a proprietary interest through its
enforcement of the covenant. 19 What qualifies as a legitimate busi-
ness interest varies from state to state, but customer relationships and
trade secrets are the most widely recognized protectable interests.20
(Ga. 1959) (finding that consideration is furnished by actual performance of continued
employment).
11. See Poole v. Incentives Unlimited, Inc., 548 S.E.2d 207, 209 (S.C. 2001) (holding continued
employment not sufficient consideration for covenant not to compete) Kadis v. Britt, 29 S.E.2d
543, 548-49 (N.C. 1944) (same).
12. See Eichmann v. Nat'l Hosp. & Health Care Servs., Inc., 719 N.E.2d 1141, 1145 (I11. App.
Ct. 1999) (addressing non-competition covenant in independent contractor relationship).
13. See Szomjassy v. OHM Corp., 132 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1048-50 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (addressing
restrictive covenant in change-of control-agreement).
14. See Central Water Works Supply, Inc. v. Fisher, 608 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Il1. App. Ct. 1993)
(equating non-competition clause in shareholder agreement with that incident to sale of
business).
15. See Herndon v. The Eli Witt Co., 420 So. 2d 920, 923 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (addressing
non-compete in settlement agreement); Justin Belt Co. v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Tex. 1974)
(holding covenant not to compete entered as a result of an out-of-court settlement was valid and
ancillary to a permissible transaction).
16. See J.C. Nichols Co v. Eddie Bauer, Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 875, 876 (W.D. Mo. 1998) (address-
ing restrictive covenant preventing sportswear retailer from operating additional stores within
certain geographic area).
17. See Snow Country Const., Inc. v. Laabs, 989 P.2d 847, 849-50 (Mont. 1999) (holding that
statutory exception allowing for covenant not to compete when the goodwill of a business has
been sold applies equally to stock and asset sales).
18. See Katherine R. Schoofs, Comment, Employer Beware: Missouri Puts Brakes on Inter-
rests Protected By a Restrictive Covenant, 70 UMKC L. REV. 171 (Fall 2001) (discussing the
scope of protectable interests).
19. Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1281 (Ariz. 1999).
20. See Easy Returns Midwest, Inc. v. Schultz, 964 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (hold-
ing that customer contacts and trade secrets are protectable interests of employer); Paramount
Termite Control Co v. Rector, 380 S.E.2d 922, 925 (Va. 1989) (finding that customer contacts of
former employees and knowledge of Paramount's methods of operation warrant the need for
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Some states, such as Illinois, have refined the business interest test so
that only "near-permanent" customer relationships qualify.21 Other
states, such as Utah, New York and Maryland, include unique services
among legitimate business interests.22 Kentucky, Pennsylvania and
Georgia hold that employee training falls within the rubric of legiti-
mate business interests,2 3 while New Hampshire and Washington re-
ject this theory and hold that an employer's interest in recouping the
costs associated with "recruiting and hiring employees" is not protect-
able through a non-compete clause. 24 Florida and Tennessee recog-
nize this interest, but with a distinction, by mandating that an
employer must show "extraordinary or specialized training" before a
restrictive covenant can be enforced. 25 Lastly, in Texas and Massa-
chusetts, as well as many other states, goodwill is a protected em-
ployer interest.2 6 With regards to the final requirement that
covenants must be reasonable in scope, "scope" actually encompasses
three factors: activity, duration, and geographical limit.27 Some states,
such as New Hampshire, Iowa and Texas, adopt the Restatement test
non-competition agreements); Ridley v. Krout, 180 P.2d 124, 129 (Wyo. 1947) (stating that spe-
cial facts that make a restrictive covenant reasonable include: possession of trade secrets, confi-
dential information communicated by employer and special influence with customer obtained
while employed).
21. See Office Mates 5, North Shore, Inc. v. Hazen, 599 N.E.2d 1072, 1080-1083 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992) (articulating near-permanency requirement).
22. See System Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah 1983) (holding that unique
services of employee is protectable employer interest); Reed, Roberts Assocs. v. Strauman, 353
N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1976) (same); Becker v. Bailey, 299 A.2d 835, 838 (Md. 1973) (same).
23. See Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp. v. Guardsmark, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 495, 500-02
(E.D. Ky. 1996) (protecting employer's interests in training and development costs of employ-
ees); Thermo-Guard, Inc. v. Cochran, 596 A.2d 188,193-94 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (same); Wesley-
Jessen, Inc. v. Armento, 519 F. Supp. 1352, 1358 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (same).
24. See National Employment Serv. Corp. v. Olsten Staffing Serv., Inc., 761 A.2d 401, 405
(N.H. 2000) (rejecting employee training as protectable interest); Copier Specialists, Inc, v. Gil-
len, 887 P.2d 919, 920 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that, in absence of other protectable inter-
ests, training of employee did not warrant enforcement of non-competition agreement).
25. See Hapney v. Cent. Garage, Inc., 579 So. 2d 127, 131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding
that "extraordinary or specialized training" is a legitimate employer interest), rev'd on other
grounds, 579 So. 2d 127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Vantage Tech., LLC v. Cross, 17 S.W.3d 637,
644-45 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that "employer may have a protectable interest in the
unique knowledge and skill that an employee receives through special training by his employer,
at least when such training is present along with other factors tending to show a protectable
interest.").
26. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 15.50(a) (Vernon 2002) (including employer goodwill as
protectable interest); IKON Office Solutions, Inc. v. Belanger, 59 F. Supp. 2d 125, 128 (D. Mass.
1999) (holding that goodwill of employer is a protectable interest, if employee cultivated his
relationship with the client during his employment with the employer).
27. See Pinnacle Performance, Inc. v. Hessing, 17 P.3d 308, 311 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001) (noting
parameters of reasonableness inquiry); UARCO Inc. v. Lam, 18 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1121 (D. Haw.
1998) (same).
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to determine reasonableness and examine three factors: (1) whether
the restriction is greater than necessary to protect the business and
goodwill of the employer; (2) whether the employer's need for protec-
tion outweighs the economic hardship which the covenant imposes on
the departing party; and (3) whether the restriction adversely affects
the interests of the public.28 If a court determines that a non-compete
is overbroad in terms of a durational2 9 or geographic30 limit, then
most will modify them, either under a reasonableness standard 3' or
the "blue-pencil" doctrine,32 so that they are narrowly tailored to pro-
tect the employer's interest. A minority group of states, including Ne-
braska and Arkansas, reject both modification doctrines and will void
overbroad covenants.33
B. Customer Non-Solicitation Covenants
A customer, or client, non-solicitation covenant is an activity re-
straint. Put another way, it does not prevent an employee from work-
ing for a competitor, but only prohibits the solicitation of a former
employer's clients.34 Because these covenants do not restrain an em-
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1979); Olsten Staffing, 761 A.2d at 403;
Phone Connection, Inc. v. Harbst, 494 N.W.2d 445, 449 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992); Peat Marwick
Main & Co. v. Haass, 818 S.W.2d 381, 386 (Tex. 1991); see also Harlan M. Blake, Employee
Agreements Not to Compete, HARV. L. REV. 625, 648-49 (1960) (stating three-pronged rule of
reason inquiry).
29. See Ferrofluidics Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum Components, Inc., 968 F.2d 1463, 1469 (1st
Cir. 1992) (upholding district court's revision of non-compete clause from five to three years).
But see Stone v. Griffin Communications & Sec. Sys., Inc., 53 S.W.3d 687, 696 (Tex. Ct. App.
2001) (upholding five-year covenant not to compete as a reasonable time restriction), rev'd on
other grounds, 71 S.W.3d 381 (Tex. App. 2001).
30. See Camco, Inc. v. Baker, 936 P.2d 829, 833-34 (Nev. 1997) (holding that territorial restric-
tion of fifty miles was overbroad since it extended beyond area where employer established
customer contacts and goodwill); Smart Corp. v. Grider, 650 N.E.2d 80, 84-85 (Ind. Ct. App.
1995) (modifying covenant not to compete so that employee was restrained only from doing
business in area where she developed and serviced clients). But see Kimball v. Anesthesia Spe-
cialists of Baton Rouge, Inc., 809 So. 2d 405, 409-12 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (refusing to enforce
covenant not to compete when no specific parish or municipality was delineated as geographical
restriction under state statute requiring such specificity).
31. See Data Mgmt., Inc. v. Greene, 757 P.2d 62, 64-65 (Alaska 1988) (rejecting "blue-pencil"
doctrine as too "mechanical" and modifying covenant not to compete under "rule of reasonable-
ness" so that legitimate interest of employer is protected).
32. See Licocci v. Cardinal Assocs., Inc., 432 N.E.2d 446, 452 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (using
"blue-pencil" doctrine to delete offending provisions of restrictive covenant), vacated on other
grounds, 445 N.E.2d 556 (Ind. 1983).
33. See CAE Vanguard v. Newman, 518 N.W.2d 652, 655-56 (Neb. 1994) (rejecting court mod-
ification of covenants); Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, 489 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Ark. 1973)
(holding that the court will not reduce the restriction to a shorter time or smaller area; thus
making a new contract).
34. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Ran, 67 F. Supp. 2d 764, 774 (E.D. Mich.
1999) (upholding as reasonable a one-year customer "anti-piracy" clause).
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ployee from pursuing a particular line of work, they are far less likely
to be invalidated in a judicial proceeding. Just as is the case with more
restrictive non-competes, customer non-solicitation clauses are judged
by a standard of reasonableness and are usually upheld when the em-
ployer enabled the employee to develop lasting customer contacts and
when the covenant is tailored to protect that interest. 35 Conversely, a
court is likely to invalidate a customer non-solicitation covenant that
prohibits an employee from soliciting clients or customers with whom
he had no contact or business relationship. 36 In Illinois, for instance,
non-solicitation clauses are not valid for every type of salesperson.
An employer must still show that the customer relationship sought to
be protected is "near-permanent," which does not allow an employer
to prevent solicitation if the sales function involves "cold-calling," if
there is relatively little customer loyalty, or if the good or service pro-
vided is fungible. 37
C. Employee Non-Solicitation Covenants
With one startling exception, employee non-solicitation covenants
have met with relatively little judicial resistance, as courts have held
that it is reasonable for an employer to protect its investment in train-
ing its staff and maintaining a competent workforce.38 Nevertheless,
they are still strictly construed against the drafting party and will not
preclude a party from hiring a competitor's employees if such passive
solicitation is not expressly prohibited. 39 Some states will even void
an employee non-solicitation covenant that bars the mere hiring of an
35. See Corson v. Universal Door Sys., Inc., 596 So. 2d 565, 568-69 (Ala. 1991) (emphasizing
importance of employer's role in introducing employee to key customers).
36. See Hulcher Servs., Inc. v. R.J. Corman R.R. Co., 543 S.E.2d 461, 467 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that employer had no protectable interest in preventing employee from soliciting cus-
tomers that employee did not know on professional level).
37. See Dam, Snell & Teveirne, Ltd. V. Verchota, 754 N.E.2d 464, 469-70 (I11. App. Ct. 2001)
(employing same "near-permanency" test for non-solicitation clauses); Henri Studio, Inc. v. Out-
door Mktg., Inc., No. 96 C 8198, 1997 WL 652351, at *4 (N.D. I11. Oct. 14, 1997) (finding no
"near-permanent" customer relationship in sales-driven business; emphasizing that customer
names were readily available and accessible; customers attended trade shows where plaintiff's
competitors were present; sales were based on individual purchase orders; no exclusivity agree-
ments; customers purchased goods from multiple manufacturers); Office Mates 5, North Shore,
Inc. v. Hazen, 599 N.E.2d 1072, 1082-86 (ttl. App. Ct. 1992) (involving account executives with
office support personnel placement agency where names of businesses with needs were well-
known, clients used many placement agencies; cold-calling was common; fifty percent of clients
never returned and two-thirds of clients had less than a three-year relationship).
38. See Balasco v. Gulf Auto Holding, Inc., 707 So. 2d 858, 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(noting importance of workforce stability).
39. See Atmel Corp. v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 30 P.3d 789, 793 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001)
(examining custom of semiconductor industry to hold that only "active" solicitation was prohib-
ited); Warner & Co. v. Solberg, 634 N.W.2d 65, 73 (N.D. 2001) (upholding employee non-solici-
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employee, as opposed to more active, aggressive efforts to recruit
away key talent.40
Missouri courts take an altogether different approach, holding that
a former employee's covenant not to solicit or encourage other em-
ployees to terminate their employment is void as an unenforceable
restraint of trade. 41 The reasoning behind this rather unique rule is
that an employer's interest in its at-will employees, or their skills, is
not a proprietary interest worthy of protection through a restrictive
covenant. 42 It remains to be seen whether Missouri's approach will be
adopted in other states.
D. Non-Disclosure Covenants
The final category of restrictive covenants, non-disclosure agree-
ments, has proven to be even less problematic than employee non-
solicitation covenants. Employee confidentiality clauses are almost al-
ways upheld if they are reasonable, but some courts have invalidated,
or modified, clauses that are clearly overbroad in terms of the type of
information they seek to prevent from disclosure.4 3 Even in the ab-
sence of a confidentiality agreement, an employee may be bound not
to disclose proprietary information as a common law duty.44 The real
value of such agreements for an employer is two-fold: (1) to identify
and prevent from disclosure certain business-specific categories of in-
formation that may not otherwise qualify as a trade secret;4 5 and (2) to
provide for liquidated damages in the event of disclosure.4 6
tation covenant which was "narrowly drawn" to penalize only active solicitation by departed
employee).
40. See Loral Corp. v. Moyes, 219 Cal. Rptr. 836, 841-43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that
hiring prohibition is void under Section 16600 of Business and Professions Code).
41. Schmersahl, Treloar & Co., v. McHugh, 28 S.W.3d 345, 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
42. Id. at 350-51.
43. See Trailer Leasing Co. v. Assocs. Commercial Corp., No. 96 C2305, 1996 WL 392135, at
*6 (N.D. I11. July 10, 1996) (holding that agreement barring employee from disclosing "any meth-
ods or manners" of business was unenforceable); Nasco, Inc. v. Gimbert, 238 S.E.2d 368, 369-70
(Ga. 1977) (holding that non-disclosure covenant barring use or disclosure of "any information
concerning any matters affecting or relating to the business of employer" was overbroad and
unenforceable).
44. See Anderson Chem. Co. v. Green, 66 S.W.3d 434, 442 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (imposing
duty on employee under common law not to disclose employer's confidential information).
45. See Bernier v. Merrill Air Eng'rs, 770 A.2d 97, 103 (Me. 2001) (holding that confidential
information protected under agreement need not be limited to trade secrets under Maine's ver-
sion of Uniform Trade Secrets Act).
46. See Overholt Crop Ins. Co. v. Travis, 941 F.2d 1361, 1369-70 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating that,
under either South Dakota or Minnesota law, liquidated damages of twice the amount of premi-
ums lost by insurance agency were reasonable estimate of damages that were difficult to calcu-
late following breach of non-solicitation and non-disclosure covenants).
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III. ANALYSIS
Although all types of restrictive covenants are judged by a standard
of reasonableness, the question remains as to whether it is reasonable
to enforce a covenant not to compete when an employee is termi-
nated. The answer, according to the reported judicial decisions, is
anything but clear. Sections A, B and C describe the judicial treat-
ment given to restrictive covenants in cases where an employer dis-
charges an employee. Following this summary of the judicial rules
developed in termination cases, Section D will examine restrictive
covenants in those employment separations that do not fit neatly into
the categories of either resignation or termination.
A. Non-Competition Covenants
Courts have taken three approaches to analyzing whether general
non-competition clauses are enforceable in discharge cases. The first,
as forcefully articulated by New York courts, holds that such cove-
nants are per se invalid when the employer discharges the employee
without cause.47 The second line of cases, representing the majority
position, adopts a middle ground; rather than creating a per se rule in
favor of either an employee or employer, these courts require a 'plus
factor' to determine enforceability and normally examine the nature
of the employer's conduct in effectuating the termination.48 In Penn-
sylvania, for instance, a non-compete is presumptively invalid in a ter-
mination case, but can be enforced in certain circumstances where a
protectable interest is threatened. 49 In many states, such as Minne-
sota, Massachusetts and Texas, courts examine whether the termina-
tion was conducted arbitrarily or in bad faith.50 Other states, such as
South Dakota and Missouri, give the trial judge the discretion to con-
sider the involuntary nature of the discharge in a flexible balancing
the equities approach.51 The third and final analysis, which only the
Florida courts have adopted so far, is decidedly pro-employer and
holds that a court cannot consider an involuntary termination in de-
termining the enforceability of a non-compete clause.5 2
47. See infra Part III.A.1 (addressing cases holding that covenant is per se invalid).
48. See infra Part III.A.2 (analyzing the middle ground - presumption against enforcement,
bad faith, or balancing the equities approach).
49. See infra Part III.A.2.a (examining the presumption against enforcement approach).
50. See infra Part III.A.2.b (examining bad faith cases and the employer-focused approach).
51. See infra Part III.A.2.c (discussing cases employing the balancing the equities analysis).
52. See infra Part III.A.3 (analyzing cases which hold that discharge is not a factor to
consider).
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1. Cases Holding That Covenant Is Per Se Invalid
Only one jurisdiction has adopted a bright-line, pro-employee view
on enforcing non-competition clauses in termination cases. New York
courts have articulated a per se rule, such that an employee who is
terminated without cause is not bound by a non-compete clause. In
Post v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,53 the New York
Court of Appeals examined the enforceability of non-competition
clauses that applied to a group of employees who had been terminated
without cause from Merrill Lynch. Merrill Lynch's pension plan had a
"forfeiture-for-competition" clause, which denied employees their
pension benefits if they competed with the firm after departure.54 The
Court, in broad language, held that the covenants were void, and the
employees' pension benefits could not be forfeited.55 In so holding,
the Court stated:
An essential aspect of [the employment relationship] ... is the em-
ployer's willingness to employ the party covenanting not to com-
pete. Where the employer terminates the employment relationship
without cause, however, his action necessarily destroys the mutual-
ity of obligation on which the covenant rests as well as the em-
ployer's ability to impose forfeiture. 56
The analysis used in Post is limited to those cases in which an em-
ployee has been terminated without cause. In subsequent New York
decisions, courts have routinely applied Post to involuntary termina-
tions without cause and have struck down non-competes as invalid per
se.57 The logical corollary to this rule, of course, is that terminations
for cause are not included, and that the restrictive covenants would
not be invalidated on this basis.
The New York courts made this for cause/without cause distinction
in two recent federal cases, Gismondi, Paglia, Sherling, M.D., P.C. v.
Franco58 and Cray v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co.59 In these cases, the
courts held that Post does not apply when an employee violates his
employment contract and is terminated for cause. 60 In Franco, the
53. Post v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 358 (N.Y. 1979).
54. Id. at 359.
55. Id. at 360-61.
56. Id.
57. SIFCO Indus., Inc. v. Advanced Plating Techs., Inc., 867 F. Supp. 155, 158-59 (S.D.N.Y.
1994).
58. Gismondi, Paglia, Sherling, M.D., P.C. v. Franco, 104 F. Supp. 2d 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
59. Cray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 171 (W.D.N.Y. 2001).
60. See Cray, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 179; Franco, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 233; see also Adrian N. Baker
& Co. v. Demartino, 733 S.W.2d 14, 18-19 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (enforcing covenant not to com-
pete when discharge of employee occurred with good cause); Patterson Int'l Corp. v. Herrin, 25
Ohio Misc. 79, 85 (Oh. Ct. Comm. Pl. 1970).
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court found that the defendant was in fact terminated for cause since
he failed to turn over hospital payments to his professional corpora-
tion, failed to promote the medical practice, misappropriated billing
records, and committed a host of other acts in contravention of his
employment contract. 61 In Cray, the court found that there was a gen-
uine issue of material fact as to whether the insurance agent, an inde-
pendent contractor, breached his agency agreement and was
terminated for cause by misappropriating trade secrets, engaging in
unauthorized brokering for third parties, and attempting to induce
policyholders to switch to different companies. 62
2. The Three Middle-Ground Analyses
The majority of cases do not go as far as the New York courts in
terms of protecting employees and, by extension, the free mobility of
labor. The middle-ground cases hold that a non-compete clause is: (1)
presumptively invalid in an involuntary discharge situation; (2) invalid
if an element of bad faith in the termination is present; or (3) invalid if
the trial judge finds that equitable considerations militate against en-
forcement of the covenant. Adding confusion to the myriad rules de-
veloped in termination cases, one jurisdiction - Illinois - which started
out as a 'bad faith' state, but has since migrated towards a categorical
analysis, similar to that set forth in Post.
a. Presumption Against Enforcement
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Insulation Corp. of America
v. Brobston63 articulated a pro-employee rule that creates a presump-
tion against enforcing non-competition clauses in termination cases.
Brobston worked for a company called ICA, which was engaged in the
manufacture and sale of polystyrene packaging, roofing and insulation
products.64 Brobston worked for ICA in several different capacities
before being promoted to general manager in 1990.65 In 1992, ICA
expanded its product line to include more specialized products
through the use of a computer-assisted design (CAD) system.66 ICA
required Brobston and other employees to execute employment con-
tracts containing restrictive covenants. 67 Shortly thereafter, Brob-
61. Franco, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 233.
62. Cray, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 176.
63. Insulation Corp. of Am. v. Brobston, 667 A.2d 729 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
64. Id. at 731.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Brobston, 667 A.2d at 731-32.
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ston's work performance deteriorated.68 He failed to file sales calls
and expense reports, and only three of his fourteen accounts showed
growth.69 The following year, ICA terminated Brobston's employ-
ment.70 Brobston subsequently found employment with an ICA
competitor. 71
The court addressed the issue of Brobston's termination in the over-
all reasonableness context. In its opinion, striking the non-compete as
void, the court stated:
Where an employee is terminated by his employer on the grounds
that he has failed to promote the employer's legitimate business in-
terests, it clearly suggests an implicit decision on the part of the em-
ployer that its business interests are best promoted without the
employee in its service. The employer who fires an employee for
failing to perform in a manner that promotes the employer's busi-
ness interests deems the employee worthless. Once such a determi-
nation is made by the employer, the need to protect itself from the
former employee is diminished by the fact that the employee's
worth to the corporation is presumably insignificant. Under such
circumstances, we conclude that it is unreasonable as a matter of
law to permit the employer to retain unfettered control over that
which it has effectively discarded as worthless to its legitimate busi-
ness interests. 72
Brobston suggests that a non-compete clause is presumptively invalid
when an employer terminates the employee. The court stated that
"[t]his conclusion would remain the same even if it were determined
that Brobston was legitimately terminated for economic reasons...
where an employer determines that its 'bottom-line' is best protected
without the employee on the payroll. However, it must be kept in
mind that reasonableness is determined on a case-by-case basis."'73
It is clear that the Brobston court believed that an economically
motivated reduction-in-force would not allow an employer to enforce
a non-compete clause. 74 Along the same lines, not all terminations for
performance deficiencies, or disagreements between employer and
employee, can be classified as terminations for cause, and frequently,
employment contracts expressly define what "for cause" means.75 Re-
gardless, Brobston's termination, even considering his poor perform-
68. Id. at 732.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Brobston, 667 A.2d at 732.
72. Id. at 735.
73. Id. at 735 n.6.
74. Id.
75. See Nairn v. Bartusiak, 29 Pa. D & C.4h 373, 383 (Pa. C.P. 1995) (holding agreement
provided that covenant not to compete would be enforced if employee was terminated with
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ance, was likely not for cause. Brobston appears to hold that
terminations without cause raise a strong presumption against enforce-
ability of a non-competition covenant.76
However, the court never made this perfectly clear. Apparently,
the dissent recognized their omission when Judge Del Sole stated:
"what is to prevent a salesperson, who has secretly been recruited by a
competitor, from purposely trying to be terminated rather than re-
signing and then working for the competitor free of the constraints of
the restrictive covenant[?]" 77 In such an extreme case, the Penn-
sylvania courts would likely seize upon the language in footnote 6,
which states that reasonableness is always determined on a case-by-
case basis.78 Cases of material breach of job duties, fraud, and breach
of fiduciary duty would likely fall within the court's limited reasona-
bleness exception.
This exception did arise in Hess v. Gebhard & Co. ,79 which involved
the termination of an insurance salesman after a corporate purchase.
In that case, Gebhard, the corporate acquirer of Hoaster's insurance
business, notified Hess that his employment as a servicer of insurance
accounts would cease on December 31, 1996.80 However, Gebhard
did give Hess two options for alternative employment, for which Hess
ultimately believed he was not qualified. 81 Prior to notifying Gebhard
of his disinterest in either position, Hess negotiated with a competitor
and solicited Gebhard clients for his new firm.82 The court noted the
Brobston ruling, but stressed that reasonableness must be determined
on a case-by-case basis.83 Deeming it important that Hess was not
"worthless" to Gebhard, the court held that the covenant not to com-
pete would be enforced. 84
Since Brobston makes it fairly clear that an economically motivated
discharge, such as that effectuated by a corporate purchase, would
void a non-compete, 85 it seems likely that the ruling in Hess had more
cause, but that employer's frustration with employee's work performance and inability to reach
an agreement to form a partnership did not fall within this provision; invalidating non-compete).
76. Cf. Horizons Res., Inc. v. Troy, No. CIV.A.14740, 1995 WL 761214 at *5 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21,
1995) (upholding non-compete clause, but stating "[t]his is not a case in which defendants were
fired by plaintiff and plaintiff then tried to stop them from finding other employment.").
77. Brobston, 667 A.2d at 739 (Del Sole, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 735 n.6.
79. Hess v. Gebhard & Co., 769 A.2d 1186 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
80. Id. at 1189.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Hess, 769 A.2d at 1192.
84. Id.
85. See Brobston, 667 A.2d at 735 n.6.
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to do with Hess' pre-termination competitive activities and his failure
to notify Gebhard that he would not accept a new position prior to the
time he solicited clients. In light of Hess, it is doubtful that Penn-
sylvania courts will go as far as New York courts in terms of protecting
a discharged employee. The rule of reasonableness certainly gives
courts some flexibility.
One commentator posits that the Pennsylvania cases can be read in
such a way that courts will invalidate non-competition clauses if the
reasons for involuntary discharge do not relate directly to the interests
the employer seeks to protect through the covenant. 86 Applying this
theory to practice, the limited situations in which an employer's termi-
nation relates directly to a protectable interest, such as pre-termina-
tion theft of trade secrets or solicitation of customers, almost certainly
would justify a termination for cause. As such, Brobston, as a practi-
cal matter, may be quite close to Post, which clearly conditions en-
forceability of a non-compete on whether the employee was
terminated for cause. In fact, Pennsylvania courts arguably may be
even more protective of employees in discharge cases, since some ter-
minations, such as insubordination, may be for cause, but unrelated to
the employer's protectable interest. Without further interpretation of
Brobston, it remains to be seen how this rule will apply in practice.
b. The "Bad Faith" Analysis
i. Rao v. Rao and the Illinois Cases
In Rao v. Rao,87 the Seventh Circuit, interpreting a novel issue of
Illinois law, held that an employee who is discharged without cause
and in bad faith could not be limited by a non-competition clause in
his employment contract. 88 In that case, Mohan, a thoracic and car-
diovascular surgeon, was the sole owner, officer and director of a
medical service corporation. 89 Hari began working at Mohan's corpo-
ration in 1976 and signed a term employment contract, renewable
from year-to-year, which contained a non-compete clause. 90 The
agreement provided that, at the end of four years of service, Hari
would be able to purchase fifty percent of Mohan's corporation for a
86. See Kurt H. Decker, Refining Pennsylvania's Standard for Invalidating a Non-Competition
Restrictive Covenant When an Employee's Termination Is Unrelated to the Employer's Protectible
Business Interest, 104 Dick. L. Rev. 619 (Summer 2000) (addressing Pennsylvania courts' treat-
ment of covenants in involuntary discharge cases).
87. Rao v. Rao, 718 F.2d 219 (7th Cir. 1983).
88. Id. at 224.
89. Id. at 221.
90. Id.
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nominal sum.91 On December 21, 1979, just prior to the time that
Hari's option to become a part-owner of the business vested, Mohan
sent a letter notifying Hari of his intent to terminate the employment
relationship. 92 Hari began competing, and Mohan sued for enforce-
ment of the non-compete clause or, in the alternative, liquidated
damages. 93
The trial court found that Hari's work performance was satisfactory,
and that he was terminated because Mohan did not want him to exer-
cise his contractual right to obtain a fifty percent interest in the corpo-
ration. 94 The appellate court affirmed the trial court's refusal to
enforce the non-compete. 95 In so holding, the Seventh Circuit first
noted that, under Illinois law, "in every contract both parties promise
to act in good faith."' 96 With this premise established, the court stated
that "[t]he implied promise of good faith ... modifies [Mohan's] dis-
cretionary right to dismiss Hari and then to invoke the restrictive cov-
enant." 97 The court held that Mohan could not enforce the covenant,
whether it analyzed the implied duty of good faith as an independent
contractual term, or whether a "good faith termination is a condition
precedent to the operation of the restrictive covenant. ' 98 Under ei-
ther analysis, the result was the same: a bad faith termination will not
allow an employer to obtain the benefit of a restrictive covenant. 99
The court's analysis, however, was somewhat unclear. In dicta, the
court seemed to shy away from a per se rule similar to that articulated
in Post, when it stated that "[tio be sure, there are cases where an
employer dismisses an employee but the employee's inadequate per-
91. Rao, 718 F.2d at 221.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 222.
95. Rao, 718 F.2d at 222.
96. Id. (citing Osten v. Shah, 433 N.E.2d 294, 296 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)).
97. Id. at 223. It is fairly clear that a wrongful termination, that is, one that is in breach of
contract, will relieve an employee from a restrictive covenant. See Washington County Mem'l
Hosp. v. Sidebottom, 7 S.W.3d 542, 546 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that employer who materi-
ally breaches employment agreement cannot enforce restrictive covenant against employee);
Bergstein v. Tech. Solutions Co., 654 N.E.2d 479, 480-81 (I11. App. Ct. 1995) (stating that invol-
untary discharge roughly one year prior to expiration of term contract relieved employee from
restrictive covenant obligations); Ward v. Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 443 N.E.2d 1342, 1343-44
(Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (holding that employer's breach of contract voids non-compete clause).
Additionally, if an employer breaches an employment agreement and an employee subsequently
resigns to start competing, the employer's material breach of the employment contract will serve
as a valid defense to enforcement. See Francorp, Inc. v. Siebert, 126 F. Supp. 2d 543, 547 (N.D.
Ill. 2000) (stating that former employer's failure to pay departed executives' salary for several
weeks necessitated their departure and excused them from non-compete obligations).
98. Rao, 718 F.2d at 223.
99. Id.
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formance, in fact, impelled the dismissal."'100 In such a case, the Rao
court stated that "a restrictive covenant may be as reasonably neces-
sary as in the cases where the employee voluntarily leaves his job."10 1
Nevertheless, the Rao court went on to state that "a restrictive cove-
nant that can become effective when an employee is terminated with-
out good cause is not reasonably necessary to protect an employer's
goodwill."' 0 2 Although this last statement could conceivably be inter-
preted as a categorical rule against enforcement, this is most likely not
what the Rao court intended, given its focus on the employer's con-
duct and its concern with the employee's job performance.
The Illinois Appellate Court muted the Rao bad faith analysis in
Bishop v. Lakeland Animal Hospital, P.C103 In the Bishop case,
neither party disputed the fact that the plaintiff, who had a four-year
non-competition clause in her employment contract, was terminated
without cause. The court agreed with the reasoning in Rao and held
that the implied promise of good faith inherent in every contract pre-
cluded enforcement of the non-compete clause when the employer
terminated the employee without cause. The Bishop court did not
mention the dicta in Rao, which cautions against a categorical rule.10 4
In fact, Bishop can certainly be read as setting forth such a categorical
rule, since the court states that "in order for a noncompetition clause
to be enforceable ... the employee must have been terminated for
cause or by his own accord." 10 5
No Illinois case since Bishop has clarified this tension definitively.
However, in Francorp, Inc. v. Siebert, the court appeared to confirm
the notion that Bishop did create a per se rule along the lines of
Post.106 After first discussing the bad faith rule articulated in Rao, the
Siebert court stated that Bishop "takes the rule farther, holding that an
employer cannot enforce a noncompetition agreement against an em-
ployee who has been dismissed without cause, even if the employment
contract authorizes such termination, because firing without cause
breaches the implied covenant of good faith inherent in every con-
100. Id. at 224.
101. Id.
102. Rao, 718 F.2d at 224.
103. Bishop v. Lakeland Animal Hosp., P.C., 644 N.E.2d 33 (I11. App. Ct. 1994).
104. Id. at 34-35 (agreeing with the reasoning employed by the seventh circuit and concluding
that when the employer dismisses the employee without cause, the implied promise of good faith
that is found in every contract precludes enforcement of a noncompetition clause).
105. Id.
106. Siebert, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 546.
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tract. ' 107 While Illinois once appeared to be in the 'bad faith' camp, it
now advocates a pro-employee per se rule.108
However, the reasoning of the Illinois cases is curious at best.10 9
Reading Siebert's interpretation of Bishop, the Siebert court seems to
hold that any termination without cause, even if authorized by the em-
ployment contract, breaches the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing."10 This seems to constitute an almost untenable proposi-
tion, because if taken literally, it would create a cause of action for
every employee who is fired without cause, which is something that
Illinois courts have refused to hold.' What the court in Siebert may
have meant is that an employer's attempt to enforce a non-compete
clause, after discharging an employee without cause, amounts to bad
faith and, concomitantly, gives rise to an affirmative defense against
enforcement. However, it is more likely that the Siebert court tried in
vain to reconcile the bad faith language in Rao with Bishop's exten-
sion of the rule. It would have been less confusing if the court just
declared that termination without cause precludes enforcement of a
covenant not to compete, as a matter of law, for that is clearly how
Bishop reads.
ii. Other 'Bad Faith' Cases and the Employer-Focused Approach
Several other jurisdictions follow the reasoning set forth in Rao and
focus on the employer's conduct in carrying out the termination to
determine the enforceability of a covenant not to compete. For in-
stance, the Supreme Court of Wyoming, in Hopper v. All-Pet Animal
Clinic, Inc.,112 held that "[s]imple justice requires that a termination
by the employer of an at will employee be in good faith if a covenant
not to compete is to be enforced.""13 Although finding that the em-
ployer's conduct in terminating the plaintiff was not in bad faith, the
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. Id.
109. Cf. Woodfield Group, Inc. v. DeLisle, 693 N.E.2d 464, 469 (I11. App. Ct. 1998) (suggesting
that employer's termination of employee may affect whether continued employment is sufficient
consideration for at-will employee's execution of non-compete clause); Simko, Inc. v. Graymar
Co., 464 A.2d 1104, 1107-08 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983) (same).
110. Siebert, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 546. Contra Schwartz v. Fortune Magazine, 89 F. Supp. 2d 429,
434 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that, under New York law, where contract permits termination
without cause, court does not inquire into claimed "bad faith" motivations for termination, but
rather determines whether party's actions in terminating the contract are consistent with termi-
nation provisions).
111. See Harrison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 546 N.E.2d 248, 255-56 (I11. App. Ct. 1989) (de-
clining to give employee cause of action for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in at-will setting).
112. Hopper, D.V.M. v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 541 (Wyo. 1993).
113. Id. at 541.
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Hopper court did give an example of what conduct might militate
against enforcement of a restrictive covenant. Specifically, the Hop-
per court noted that a covenant might be void "if an employer hired
an employee at will, obtained a covenant not to compete, and then
terminated the employee, 'without cause, to arbitrarily restrict
competition."' 1 4
Both Tennessee and Mississippi follow the Wyoming approach and
judge the overall reasonableness of the covenant through considera-
tion of the nature of the dismissal. For instance, in Central Adjustment
Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram,1' 5 the Tennessee Supreme Court stated that
"[a]lthough an at-will employee can be discharged for any reason
without breach of contract, a discharge which is arbitrary, capricious
or in bad faith clearly has a bearing on whether a court of equity
should enforce a non-competition covenant. 11 6 The Supreme Court
of Mississippi, in Empiregas, Inc. v. Bain,117 used an identical test. 118
Similarly, Minnesota courts will not enforce restrictive covenants
against discharged employees where the employer has taken "undue
advantage" of its right to terminate, 119 or where the employer's con-
duct was "unconscionable" by reason of a "bad motive.' 20 Similar to
the court's analysis in Rao, these courts examine the employer's con-
duct and the motives behind the discharge, but not necessarily its ef-
fect on the employee.
Indiana courts took a similar approach in Gomez v. Chua Medical
Corp.,121 holding that "[w]here the employee is discharged in bad faith
... the covenant will not be enforced through the operation of eq-
uity. 1 22 The Gomez court reasoned that a fact-intensive inquiry into
whether an employee is discharged with or without cause would be
unduly burdensome and would detract from the central issues of a
non-compete dispute.' 23 Furthermore, the Gomez court emphasized
the freedom of parties to contract with one another and placed the
burden on the employee to decline employment if the covenant is not
limited in the desired manner. 24
114. Id.
115. Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28 (Tenn. 1984).
116. Id. at 35.
117. Empiregas, Inc. v. Bain, 599 So. 2d 971 (Miss. 1992).
118. Id. at 975.
119. Granger v. Craven, 199 N.W. 10, 14 (Minn. 1924).
120. Edin v. Jostens, Inc., 343 N.W.2d 691, 694 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
121. Gomez v. Chua Med. Corp., 510 N.E.2d 191 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
122. Id. at 194.
123. Id. at 195.
124. Id.
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Two older cases from Massachusetts and Texas employed similar
tests in refusing to enforce non-competition clauses against employees
who were discharged without cause. In both Economy Grocery Stores
Corp. v. McMenamy125 and Security Services, Inc. v. Priest,2 6 the
courts noted that principles of equity might deny enforcement of a
restrictive covenant if the employer acts arbitrarily and unreasonably
in discharging the employee. 12 7 In Priest, the employer hired a sales-
person, obtained the benefit of his client contacts and, after those con-
tacts were "saturated," discharged the salesperson within a matter of
months.128 The employer's opportunistic conduct clearly amounted to
an unreasonable exercise of its discretion to discharge the employee
while simultaneously seeking to enforce a non-compete clause. In
McMenamy, the facts indicated that the defendant, a manager at a
department store, performed his job according to expectations only to
be terminated "in circumstances involving some humiliation to
him.1 29 In a rather significant decision, the Supreme Court of Massa-
chusetts took into account not only the employer's conduct, but also
the employee's expectation of continuing his employment and the fact
that the employer terminated the employment relationship in the
midst of the Great Depression.1 30 A countervailing public interest
may have had some role in the court's decision.
c. The Balancing the Equities Analysis
The McMenamy ruling suggests that factors other than just the em-
ployer's conduct should be considered before enforcing a covenant
not to compete against a discharged employee. 131 Several cases take
the lead from this Depression-era decision and employ a more flexible
balancing the equities analysis. South Dakota, Iowa and Missouri
provide examples.
South Dakota courts take a unique and flexible approach in their
analysis of covenants not to compete by making a clear distinction
125. Economy Grocery Stores Corp. v. McMenamy, 195 N.E. 747 (Mass. 1935).
126. Security Servs., Inc. v. Priest, 507 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
127. McMenamy, 195 N.E. at 748; Priest, 507 S.W.2d at 595.
128. Priest, 507 S.W.2d at 594.
129. McMenamy, 195 N.E. at 748; see also Kroeger v. Stop & Shop Cos., Inc., 432 N.E.2d 566,
572 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (citing McMenamy and holding that if discharge is "inequitable,"
restrictive covenant may not be enforceable); cf. Custard Ins. Adjusters, Inc. v. Nardi, No.
CV980061967S, 2000 WL 562318, at *15-16 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2000) (finding that em-
ployer did not discharge employee in bad faith and declining to void non- compete on this
ground; considering manner in which employee was terminated, whether he was replaced by
younger worker, and personality clash with superiors).
130. McMenamy, 195 N.E. at 748-49.
131. Id.
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between resignation and for cause terminations, on the one hand, and
termination without cause cases on the other. If an employee volunta-
rily resigns, or is fired for cause, then a court will examine only
whether the covenant is reasonable, both geographically and tempo-
rally, under the state statute governing restrictive covenants. 132 How-
ever, if an employee is fired through no fault of his own, then a court
will scrutinize whether the agreement is reasonable, by giving consid-
eration to: (1) the extent of the restraint, including its territorial scope
and duration; (2) the nature of the business or profession involved,
including the employee's position and duties; (3) the effect of enforce-
ment on the discharged employee; and (4) the public interest in the
employee being able to continue in that field.133 The trial judge is
obligated to consider these factors in a termination case and balance
the competing interests to determine reasonableness. 134
Iowa courts also employ a comprehensive balancing test. In Ma &
Pa, Inc. v. Kelly, 35 the employer terminated a salesman of petroleum
products during the 1982 recession, due to a change in market condi-
tions and an unprofitable commission arrangement. The termination
was clearly without cause. 136 The employer sued the employee after
he went to work for a competitor, where he had undercut his former
employer's bids, and obtained some of its largest customers. 37 The
Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the trial court's grant of an injunc-
tion against the employee and declined to enforce the three-year, 25-
mile non-compete clause.138 The Court considered the following fac-
tors in its overall balancing test: (1) the discharge by the employer; (2)
the hardship to the employee's family if the injunction were upheld;
(3) the employee's limited skills in other fields; (4) his attempts to find
other jobs without success; (5) the fact that his employment was termi-
nated during a recession; (6) a well-known field of potential customers
in the industry; and (7) the former employer's uncompetitive
pricing. 139
132. Id. at 519; see also S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 53-9-11 (Michie 2002) (containing maximum
time and geographic limits on restrictive covenants).
133. Central Monitoring Serv., Inc., v. Zakinski, 553 N.W.2d 513, 519 (S.D. 1996).
134. Id.
135. Ma & Pa, Inc. v. Kelly, 342 N.W.2d 500 (Iowa 1984).
136. Id. at 501.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 503.
139. Kelly, 342 N.W.2d at 502-03.
[Vol. 1:1
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
Missouri courts relied on the well-reasoned opinion in Kelly to for-
mulate a balancing the equities rule. In Showe-Time Video Rentals,
Inc. v. Douglas,'14 the court announced that:
[I]f a non-compete covenant is reasonable as to length of time and
size of territory, and if the evidence establishes that the covenant is
ancillary to a legitimate protectable interest of the party in whose
favor the covenant runs, the covenant will be enforced by injunction
where the party against whom it runs is the party that terminates the
arrangement and begins competing against the other party.141
The court also held that injunctive enforcement would be granted in
those instances where the party, in whose favor the covenant runs,
terminates the arrangement with good cause. 142
Nevertheless, the court did not establish a per se rule along the
same lines as Post or Bishop. Instead, the Douglas court chose to rely
on Kelly's balancing the equities approach in its affirmation of the trial
court's decision to deny injunctive relief.143 The factors that the court
deemed important in its balancing the equities analysis were: (1) the
plaintiff's decision to terminate the agreement; (2) the availability of
numerous distributors to supply movie rentals; (3) lack of any trade
secrets; and (4) the unprofitability of the distribution arrangement to
the supplier prior to termination. 144
3. Cases Holding That Discharge Is Not a Factor to Consider
At the opposite end of the spectrum from pro-employee cases such
as Post, Brobston and Bishop lie the cases that are decidedly protec-
tive of the employer's business interests. These rare cases hold that an
involuntary discharge is not even a factor to consider when determin-
ing the enforceability of a non-competition clause.
a. The Twenty-Four Collection, Inc. v. Keller
In The Twenty-Four Collection, Inc. v. Keller,145 the former em-
ployee (Keller), a buyer for a women's retail clothing store, was dis-
charged by Twenty-Four Collection eighteen months after she signed a
two-year non-compete that encompassed Dade, Broward and Palm
140. Showe-Time Video Rentals, Inc. v. Douglas, 727 S.w.2d 426 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
141. Id. at 433.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 433-34.
144. Douglas, 727 S.W.2d at 434; see also Property Tax Representatives, Inc. v. Chatam, 891
S.W.2d 153, 157-58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming trial court's denial of injunction on non-
competition clause when employee was discharged without good cause; noting that trial court
made finding of fact that reasons for dismissal were not "for cause" when employee conducted
casual business on his own time that did not amount to conflict of interest with employer).
145. Twenty Four Collection, Inc. v. Keller, 389 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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Beach Counties in Florida. 146 A month after she was fired, Keller
went to work for 24 Collection's primary competitor, Cache, and 24
Collection brought a claim for an injunction to prevent Keller from
working for Cache. 147 The Third District Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court's order denying 24 Collection's injunction and re-
manded for a determination as to whether the temporal and geo-
graphic limitations of the non-compete clause were reasonable. 148
The court held that the trial judge erred in balancing the equities and
avoiding a harsh result that would have emanated from the injunc-
tion.149 The court alluded to, but never directly confronted, the invol-
untary discharge, and it instead relied on a strict reading of Florida
law, which does not allow a court to consider whether the enforce-
ment of a non-compete would lead to an "unjust result.' 50 In Flor-
ida, as the Keller court's analysis suggests, as long as a covenant is
reasonably limited in time and geographic scope, it is valid.151 Since
Keller signed the non-compete, she was bound to it, regardless of how
her employment ended or whether other equitable factors in her favor
were present. 152 Florida's approach is the opposite of that taken in
South Dakota, which has a similar statute governing restrictive cove-
nants but mandates that a trial judge balance the equities when an
employee is fired without cause. 153 To date, Florida is the only juris-
diction unwilling to consider an employee's termination when judging
whether a non-compete is enforceable. 154
b. A Florida Limit to Keller?
The Florida rule in Keller was eroded somewhat by a subsequent
appellate court ruling in Kupscznk v. Blasters, Inc. 155 In the Kupscznk
146. Id. at 1062.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1064.
149. Keller, 389 So. 2d at 1063.
150. Id. (citing FLA. STFAT. ANN. § 542.12(2) (West 1977) (current version at FLA. SrAT. ANN.
§ 542.33(2) (West 2002))).
151. Id.
152. Cf. Gold Coast Media, Inc. v. Meltzer, 751 So. 2d 645, 646 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that employee's promise not to compete upon "my termination from employment or
engagement by the company" constituted promise not to compete in cases of both voluntary and
involuntary termination).
153. Central Monitoring Serv., Inc. v. Zakinski, 553 N.W.2d 521 (S.D. 1996).
154. Cf. Weber v. Tillman, 913 P.2d 84, 91-92 (Kan. 1996) (applying balancing test to deter-
mine reasonableness of non-compete's enforceability, but failing to analyze physician's involun-
tary discharge); General Surgery, P.A. v. Suppes, 953 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998)
(declining to enforce covenant not to compete in termination case when contract language indi-
cated that employee must end employment before covenant could be triggered).
155. Kupscznk v. Blasters, Inc., 647 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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case, the court addressed a claim by an employee that his former em-
ployer's reduction of his commissions constituted a breach of his em-
ployment contract, rendering the non-compete unenforceable. On the
merits, the court ruled in favor of the employer.156 However, in dicta,
the court stated:
We recognize, however, that in rare circumstances equitable consid-
erations could possibly render a noncompetition agreement void.
For instance, had Blasters hired Kupscznk under the same terms
and then terminated him without cause after a very short time, even
though the termination would not be wrongful under the Florida at-
will employment doctrine, Blasters' conduct might be deemed un-
conscionable and a court of equity would not permit its perpetua-
tion by entry of an injunction.157
While this statement arguably is at odds with Keller, it appears that, to
reconcile the two cases, the employee still would bear a heavy burden
of proving unconscionability as an affirmative defense. In other
words, the issue would not be examined in the context of overall rea-
sonableness, which Section 542.12(2) of the Florida statutes does not
permit. 158 However, Kupscznk gives employees some ability to argue
that the enforcement of a non-compete might be manifestly unjust in
the case of an involuntary termination.
Section 542.12(2), which has been interpreted to remove any discre-
tion the trial judge may have to balance the equities, has not received
universal acclaim. In Capraro v. Lanier Business Products, Inc.,159
Justice Overton, in a dissenting opinion, took the unusual step of call-
ing on the Florida legislature to modify or repeal Section 542.12(2), to
allow courts to use "proper equitable principles when injunctive relief
is sought to enforce noncompetition agreements.' 60
4. Analysis
a. The Fault Inherent in the 'Cause/Without Cause' Distinction
Rao, as well as other decisions employing the bad faith analysis,
may have recognized a problem with crafting a per se rule that makes
a distinction between terminations without cause and those with
cause. Quite simply, it is extremely difficult to determine what consti-
tutes cause for dismissal. Frequently, an employment contract will list
several categories of conduct that qualify as cause for dismissal, such
156. Id. at 891.
157. Id.
158. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.12(2) (West 1977) (current version at FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 542.33(2) (West 2002)).
159. Capraro v. Lanier Bus. Prods., Inc., 466 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1985).
160. Id. at 214 (Overton, J., dissenting).
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as conviction of a felony, fraud, or insubordination. However, in the
absence of such a contractual provision, when does conduct cross the
line so as to warrant dismissal for cause? Even if a contract defines
what cause is, should courts be constrained by that definition, which
may be part of an adhesion contract, or should they adopt a more
judicially accepted definition of cause? Logically, the specific contract
language should be a consideration, but certainly not a controlling
one, since courts have historically modified the precise contract lan-
guage in restrictive covenant disputes to comport with an overarching
standard or reasonableness.
Some states define "cause" under the common law, which might
give a court some guidance in applying a per se rule. In Illinois, for
instance, "cause" has been defined as "some substantial shortcoming,
recognized by law and public opinion as a good reason for termina-
tion."'1 61 New Mexico's definition is marginally more helpful. In Dan-
zer v. Professional Insurors, Inc.,162 the court held that termination for
cause guarantees against the "whim and caprice of an employer" and
allows discharge only for legal cause, that is, "some causes inherent in
and related to qualifications of the employee or a failure to properly
perform some essential aspect of the employee's job function. '163
Good cause would be easy to establish in cases where an employee
committed fraud, breached his fiduciary duty, or violated company
policy. 164 At the opposite end of the spectrum, economically moti-
vated terminations, discharges resulting from a reduction-in-force and
terminations due to a personality clash, almost certainly cannot be
considered as dismissals for good cause. 165
161. Norman v. Bd. of Fire & Police Comm'rs of Zion, 614 N.E.2d 499, 504 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993).
162. Danzer v. Prof'l Insurors, Inc., 679 P.2d 1276 (N.M. 1984).
163. Id. at 1280-81.
164. See Superior Gearbox Co. v. Edwards, 869 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (discuss-
ing the fact that "just cause" is not a well-defined concept under Missouri law, but that it has
been held to encompass an employee's "lying, stealing, repeated absences or lateness, destruc-
tion of company property, brawling and similar infractions."); Kroeger v. Stop & Shop Cos., Inc.,
432 N.E.2d 566, 572 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (employee theft would constitute termination for
"cause").
165. Brooks v. Bd. of Comm'rs of CHA, No. 97 C 5166, 1998 WL 214669 at *3 (N.D. I11. Apr.
21, 1998) (reduction-in-force is fundamentally different than a termination for cause); Franks v.
Magnolia Hosp., 888 F. Supp. 1310,1313-14 (N.D. Miss. 1995) (same); Insulation Corp. of Am. v.
Brobston, 667 A.2d 729, 735 n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (noting that economically motivated dis-
charge would void non-compete). But cf. Custard Ins. Adjusters, Inc. v. Nardi,
No.CV980061967S, 2000 WL 562318 at *15-16 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2000) (noting em-
ployee's personality clash with former employer, but declining to release employee from non-
compete).
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The toughest cases to clarify in the for cause/without cause spec-
trum are those where an employer claims that the employee's per-
formance was inadequate. Rao suggests that inadequate performance
does rise to the level of termination for cause and that an employee's
dismissal on this basis may not relieve him of an otherwise valid non-
compete obligation.166 Conversely, Brobston, and even the dissenting
opinion in that case, implies that a performance-based termination,
short of insubordination or breach of a fiduciary duty, does not rise to
the level of cause.167
In the final analysis, the mere labeling of a discharge as for cause or
without cause cannot control. Without question, it is a factor for the
court to examine, but crafting a rule on this basis seems unworkable
and would lead to an inquisition into the discharged employee's job
performance and whether it rises to the level of good cause for
dismissal. A collateral inquiry into past job performance is not the
most efficient way of resolving disputes involving restrictive cove-
nants, because the vast majority of such cases need to be dealt with on
emergency injunction hearings. 168 Since the parties only have the
benefit of limited, expedited discovery, the hearings must focus on the
interests of the employer, the employee and the public in determining
whether the covenant should be enforced.
b. Florida's Anomaly
Florida's approach, as stated in Justice Overton's dissenting opinion
in Capraro, seems unduly restrictive of competition, could yield po-
tentially inequitable results, and provides no judicial check on abusive
practices by employers who extract non-competes from their employ-
ees. Rather, Florida's test should be considered an anomaly, the
product of a statute that removes all of the trial judge's discretion to
consider notions of equity in deciding whether to enforce a covenant
not to compete. By its very nature, the test is antithetical to any in-
junction proceeding.
c. The Flaw of the Conduct-Driven 'Bad Faith' Rule
Although both per se rules are too inflexible, the bad faith analysis
is far from perfect. The most troubling aspect of the bad faith test is
the courts' single-handed focus on the employer's conduct in effectu-
ating the termination, without regard for its impact on the employee
166. Rao v. Rao, 718 F.2d 219, 224 (7th Cir. 1983).
167. Brobston, 667 A.2d at 735, 739 (Del Sole, J., dissenting).
168. See Gomez v. Chua Med. Corp., 510 N.E.2d 191, 195 (noting how inquiry into reason for
termination does not fit with role courts should play in enforcing non-compete clauses).
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or the public interest. Rao presents a rather classic situation in which
the employer had a bad motive for terminating the employee -
preventing the employee from obtaining an equitable interest in the
business that the employee had indisputably earned. 169 However, it is
fair to say that an employer's ill motive or bad faith does not control
many terminations.
In the more straightforward termination, are other elements, such
as the effect of the termination on the worker or the presence of an
overriding public interest, to be considered? The answer is not partic-
ularly clear in bad faith jurisdictions, but case law suggests that the
courts are willing to step outside the restraints of the bad faith analysis
and consider other factors, even if they do not acknowledge that such
factors are part of a governing test. The 1935 McMenamy decision,
which purports to apply a derivative of the bad faith approach, sug-
gests that courts should examine factors other than the employer's
conduct or underlying motive. 170
d. The Soundness of the 'Balancing the Equities' Approach
The balancing the equities approach is a logical extension of what
considerations the McMenamy court took into account. The balancing
the equities test solves the fundamental flaw of the Rao analysis; all
equitable factors, not just an employer's conduct, warrant scrutiny in
determining the enforceability of a restrictive covenant in a termina-
tion case. The decisions in Kelly and Douglas provide examples of
how courts have used a flexible balancing test to achieve a just result.
The balancing the equities approach allows a trial judge to analyze a
host of factors, some of which are likely to be unique to individual
cases. In terms of the employer's interests, the most likely factors that
a court will consider are: (1) the strength of the protectable interest;171
(2) the reason for the termination; 172 (3) the nature of the business;a73
(4) the protections through a less restrictive non-solicitation or non-
disclosure covenant; 174 and (5) whether the discharge was conducted
in bad faith.' 75
With respect to the employee's interests, the hardship resulting
from enforcement is a primary consideration. Courts will presumably
169. Rao, 718 F.2d 219 at 221.
170. Economy Grocery Stores Corp. v. McMenamy, 195 N.E. 747, 748-49 (Mass. 1935).
171. Showe-Time Video Rentals, Inc. v. Douglas, 727 S.W.2d 426, 434 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
172. Brobston, 667 A.2d at 734-35.
173. Douglas, 727 S.W.2d at 434.
174. Brobston, 667 A.2d at 735.
175. Rao v. Rao, 718 F.2d 219, 223 (7th Cir. 1983).
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take into account the employee's skills, tenure with the employer, ed-
ucation level, and experience in other fields of work. 176 Other secon-
dary factors, if applicable, may also need to be considered, such as the
employee's opportunities, if any, to negotiate the terms of the employ-
ment contract 177 and any other available job opportunities.178
Lastly, certain public interests need to be considered. Two primary
public interests that should influence a trial judge's decision are the
economic climate that is prevailing at the time of discharge 179 and
whether the community would be deprived of the employee's unique
services, such as whether a comparable professional can replace the
employee. 180
The main advantages of the balancing the equities approach are its
flexibility and the fact that it gives the trial judge discretion to con-
sider factors unique to each case. Given the myriad situations in
which non-compete disputes arise, the balancing the equities test per-
mits courts to adapt their analysis to account for all relevant factors,
which the per se rules and the bad faith test do not.181
176. Ma & Pa, Inc. v. Kelly, 342 N.W.2d 500, 502-03 (Iowa 1984); see also Philip G. Johnson &
Co. v. Salmen, 317 N.W.2d 900, 904 (Neb. 1982) (noting that considerations in evaluating reason-
ableness include, inter alia, "the covenantor's training, health, education and needs of his
family.").
177. See Weseley Software Dev. v. Burdette, 977 F. Supp. 137, 141 (D. Conn. 1997) (noting
employee's opportunity to suggest changes to employment contract); Salmen, 317 N.W.2d at 904
(considering "degree of inequality of bargaining power").
178. Kelly, 342 N.W.2d at 502-03.
179. See id. (noting that employee was discharged during the 1982 recession); Salmen, 317
N.W.2d at 904; McMenamy, 195 N.E. at 748-49.
180. See Iredell Digestive Disease Clinic, P.A. v. Petrozza, 373 S.E.2d 449, 455 (N.C. Ct. App.
1988) (declining to enforce covenant not to compete on basis of public interest in receiving
choices in adequate, affordable health care), affd, 377 S.E.2d 750 (N.C. 1989).
181. The author respectfully disagrees with the conclusion set forth in an article addressing
the same subject, which advocates a uniform approach in analyzing non-competition covenants,
regardless of how the relationship ended. See Andrew J. Gallo, Comment, A Uniform Rule for
Enforcement of Non-Competition Contracts in Relation to Termination Cases, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 719 (Fall 1998). Specifically, this article advocates that the Florida rule is the most
sound, and it reasons "the method of termination" has "no direct bearing upon the separate
exchange that is the subject of the non-competition clause." Id. at 741-42. As a practical matter,
it is only in the rarest of cases that an employee - either prospective or existing - has enough
leverage to negotiate, modify or remove a restrictive covenant from an employment contract
presented to her. Therefore, it is highly unusual for employer and employee to have a "separate
exchange" for a restrictive covenant. If the employer and employee do bargain separately for
the covenant, then this may be a factor for a court to consider. However, to remove such a key
element from a reasonableness analysis ignores not only the historical function of chancery
courts to consider all equitable considerations before fashioning injunctive relief, but also the
unique facts and circumstances inherent in restrictive covenant disputes.
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B. Non-Solicitation Clauses
Customer non-solicitation clauses are far less restrictive of competi-
tion than traditional non-competes. They represent the classic form of
an activity restraint and, in theory, should be narrowly tailored to pro-
tect client relationships. Nevertheless, the presence of a non-solicit
clause in a former employee's contract is a significant deterrent for
that worker in his efforts to find a new job. For many salespersons,
the extent of their contacts and ability to bring in a book of business
to their new job is of paramount importance, not only for getting
hired, but also for attaining an incentive compensation level commen-
surate with their experience. Given these business realities, how
should non-solicitation clauses be judged in involuntary discharge
cases?
Only two states have addressed the question of whether a customer
non-solicitation clause is affected by an employee's involuntary dis-
charge. Adding to the lack of clarity emanating from non-competition
cases, the decisions reach opposite results. Missouri courts have de-
termined that otherwise enforceable non-solicit clauses remain valid
in a termination case, while New York courts hold that they do not.
1. The Chatam Rule - Covenant Enforceable
In Property Tax Representatives, Inc. v. Chatam,182 the Missouri
Court of Appeals addressed whether a non-competition clause and a
non-solicitation clause are enforceable against an employee who is
terminated without cause. 183 The trial court in Chatham, following
the rule established in Douglas, held that both restrictive covenants
were unenforceable. 184 On appeal, the court reversed the trial court's
decision and upheld the non-solicitation covenant. 185 In noting that
the "non-solicitation provision of the contract stands on different foot-
ing than the non-competition provision," the court held that it was
"perfectly fair" to prevent the employee from exploiting, for his own
benefit and the employer's detriment, the customer contacts, goodwill,
and his knowledge of the clients' business. 186 The Chatam decision
clearly separates non-competition clauses from other activity-based
restrictive covenants.
182. Property Tax Representatives, Inc. v. Chatam, 891 S.W.2d 153 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
183. Id. at 155.
184. Id. at 157-58.
185. Id. at 158.
186. Chatham, 891 S.W2d at 158; see also American Pamcor, Inc. v. Klote, 438 S.W.2d 287,
291 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969) (enforcing customer non-solicitation covenant after employee was dis-
charged in "reduction-in-force").
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2. The UFG International Rule - Covenant Unenforceable
In stark contrast to Chatarn is the New York Bankruptcy Court's
decision in In re UFG International, Inc.187 In UFG, a Chapter 11
trustee brought an adversary proceeding against former employees,
claiming violations of customer non-solicitation provisions in their
employment contracts. 188 Relying on the Post decision, the court
stated:
These cases (Post and the cases following it) involved even greater
restrictions on employee mobility than do the covenants that the
plaintiff seeks to enforce in this case. In each of the foregoing cases,
the covenant at issue would have prevented the employee from en-
gaging for a period of time in any work of the type that had been
done for the employer, while in this case the covenants merely for-
bade the solicitation of UFG's customers for a period of time.
Nonetheless, the same rule should apply. The cases, which hold that
a covenant not to compete is unenforceable against an employee
who is terminated without cause, are premised on the unfairness of
permitting an employer who has destroyed the mutuality of obliga-
tion on which the covenant rests to benefit from the covenant. [Cit-
ing Post]. The same reasoning applies even when the covenant does
not entirely restrict the employee's mobility, but restricts him only
from dealing with certain customers. Regardless of the scope of the
restrictive covenant, an employer cannot hobble his employee by
terminating him without cause and then enforcing a restriction that
diminishes his ability to find comparable employment. 189
New York, by virtue of Post and UFG, is the most pro-employee state
in terms of invalidating restrictive covenants in discharge cases. The
court in UFG recognized that a customer non-solicitation covenant
can be tantamount to a non-compete and can effectively shut a worker
out of prospective job opportunities. 90 The UFG court appeared to
focus not on the precise type of restrictive covenant at issue, but
rather: (1) the restriction on employee mobility; (2) the employer's
unilateral decision to discharge the employee without cause; and (3)
the inherent unfairness of first firing someone and then attempting to
enforce a restrictive covenant.' 91
C. Non-Disclosure Clauses
Covenants restricting the disclosure of trade secrets and confiden-
tial information should be enforced, regardless of how the employ-
187. In re UFG Int'l, Inc., 225 B.R. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
188. Id. at 52-53.
189. Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
190. Id.
191. UFG, 225 B.R. at 56.
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ment relationship ends. The court in Brobston, one of the strongest
pro-employee decisions, upheld a non-disclosure covenant in the con-
text of an involuntary discharge without cause. 192 Since employees
have a common law duty not to disclose confidential information of a
former employer, 193 and can be sued under a trade secret misappro-
priation theory, the enforceability of non-disclosure covenants almost
certainly will not depend on the method or manner of termination.
D. Other Issues in the Termination Context
Although the vast majority of employment relationships end either
in resignation by the employee or termination by the employer, cer-
tain changes in an employee's status do not necessarily fit into either
of those categories. For example, an employee may have a term con-
tract for a number of years and, at the end of the contract period, the
parties simply decline to renew it. Is the employee bound by a restric-
tive covenant contained in the expired agreement? Additionally, an
employee may claim that she was constructively discharged, in that
she felt that the working conditions were so intolerable that anyone
would feel forced to resign. How should a constructive discharge be
analyzed if an employee seeks to compete with her former employer?
Finally, an employer may sell the business to a corporate purchaser,
one for whom the employee had no expectation of rendering services.
In the context of a small, closely-held business, the change of control
can have significant repercussions within the employee ranks. Is the
restrictive covenant assignable? For all of these potential fact-pat-
terns, courts have come up with some unique, and divergent, analyses.
1. Expiration of Contract Term/Nonrenewal
Although most employees have at-will status, so that the employ-
ment relationship can be terminated at any time, with or without
cause, certain employees have term contracts. These agreements set
the number of years that the parties are obligated to continue the em-
ployment relationship. Frequently, these contracts contain 'rollover'
clauses, which provide for automatic renewal of the agreement from
192. Insulation Corp. of Am. v. Brobston, 667 A.2d 729, 737-38 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
193. Anderson Chem. Co. v. Green, 66 S.W.3d 434, 442 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that
while a former employee may use general skills, knowledge and experiences acquired during
employment, a former employee may not use trade secrets or other confidential information
acquired during employment); Ed Nowogroski Ins., Inc. v. Rucker, 971 P.2d 936, 941-42 (Wash.
1999) (discussing how even without an enforceable non-compete covenant, a former employee
still remains under a duty not to use or disclose, to the harm of his former employer, trade
secrets acquired during employment).
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year-to-year, unless one party provides notice of its intent not to re-
new in advance of the contract's expiration date.
Reported case law has given relatively little attention to whether a
covenant not to compete is enforceable if the employee's term con-
tract simply lapses or expires. In such a situation, neither party af-
firmatively terminates the agreement; rather, when the term comes to
an end, the parties walk away from the relationship. Is the restrictive
covenant enforceable, or is the employee free to work in whatever
capacity she chooses? An employer could argue that it bargained for
the covenant, regardless of how the employment relationship ended,
and that it should be enforced even if no premature termination oc-
curs. On the other hand, the employee could argue that the covenant
applies only to an early parting of the ways, whether at the behest of
the employee or employer, and does not apply when the contract term
expires. As can be gleaned from the case law, the results of covenant
disputes in nonrenewal cases turn on the issue of contract
construction.
a. Expansive Reading of Contract - The Daniel Boone Clinic
In The Daniel Boone Clinic, P.S.C. v. Dahhan,194 a medical clinic
hired Dahhan for a term of eighteen months and provided for a cove-
nant not to compete for a commensurate period "following the termi-
nation of employment." 195 At the end of the contract term, the clinic
declined to renew Dahhan's contract, and he immediately opened an
office for the private practice of medicine within the covenant's re-
stricted territory. 196 The clinic filed a claim for injunctive -relief
against Dahhan to enforce the 18-month covenant not to compete in
his expired employment contract. 197 The court rejected Dahhan's ar-
gument that, since his contract was not "terminated" by the clinic, the
plain meaning of the contract did not preclude him from competing.1 98
The court reasoned that, "termination means ending, however accom-
plished," and that an affirmative act of either party or its expiration
could end a contract. 199
194. The Daniel Boone Clinic, P.S.C. v. Dahhan, 734 S.W.2d 488 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987).
195. Id. at 489.
196. Id. at 490.
197. Id.
198. The Daniel Boone Clinic, 734 S.W.2d at 490.
199. Id.
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b. Narrow Reading of Contract - Clinch Valley Physicians
The Supreme Court of Virginia reached virtually the opposite result
in Clinch Valley Physicians, Inc. v. Garcia.200 In the Clinch Valley
case, Garcia signed an employment agreement with his physician
shareholder group for a term of one year, which was to continue from
year-to-year unless either party gave its intent not to renew within
thirty days of expiration.20 1 The contract also contained a covenant
not to compete, which stated that, "Upon termination of this agree-
ment, for any reasons whatsoever, [Garcia] shall not, for a period of
three (3) years thereafter, engage in the practice of medicine or sur-
gery in a radius of twenty-five (25) miles of Richlands. ''20 2 The physi-
cian group notified Garcia that it would not renew his employment
contract. 20 3 Garcia filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to de-
termine the enforceability of the contract's non-competition clause.20 4
The Court noted that the non-compete was intended to go into effect
upon termination of the agreement "for any reasons whatsoever. '20 5
However, the court held that the non-compete did not become effec-
tive upon the parties' failure to renew the contract.20 6 Instead, the
Court examined other provisions of the employment agreement and
found that the physician group could not terminate Garcia for reasons
other than cause, prior to the expiration of the contract.207 Constru-
ing the language of these provisions with the termination language in
the non-compete provision, the Clinch Valley court found that applica-
tion of the restrictive covenant was limited to terminations for cause,
even if this is not what the physician group had intended.208
The Daniel Boone Clinic and Clinch Valley are difficult to reconcile,
and the decisions provide an example of what can happen when courts
fail to articulate an overriding principle and instead rely on principles
of contract construction. Arguably, Garcia's agreement was much
clearer, since the covenant not to compete was to be enforced on "ter-
mination ... for any reasons whatsoever." However, the Clinch Valley
court held that the language was not applicable in the context of con-
200. Clinch Valley Physicians, Inc. v. Garcia, 414 S.E.2d 599 (Va. 1992).
201. Id. at 600.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Clinch Valley, 414 S.E.2d at 601.
205. Id.
206. Id. (stating that the Court is limited to the language of the contract and that CVP should
have said stated its intentions in explicit terms if it had desired to make the restrictive covenant
applicable upon renewal).
207. Id.
208. Clinch Valley, 414 S.E.2d at 601.
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tract non-renewals, ultimately ruling in favor of the employee.20 9 In
The Daniel Boone Clinic, despite the fact that the agreement only
mentioned "termination," the court broadly interpreted the contract
and held that the restrictive covenant was operative even upon expira-
tion of the contract term.210 The results are tough to square.
c. Florida's Rule - "Expiration" Must Be Clearly Included
Florida, which is often regarded as the most pro-employer state in
terms of restrictive covenant enforcement, takes a more employee
friendly approach in its nonrenewal cases; 'expiration' must be men-
tioned in the contract as a non-compete trigger. In Brenner v. Barco
Chem. Div., Inc.,211 the Florida District Court of Appeals held that a
non-compete provision survived the expiration of an employment
agreement, where it expressly provided that its terms would continue
after expiration if the employee continued to work without renewing
the contract, and where the non-compete clause would continue fol-
lowing "expiration or termination" of the employment.212 Florida
courts held in both Sanz v. R. T. Aerospace Corp.2 13 and Storz Broad-
casting Co. v. Courtney,214 that a non-compete was unenforceable in a
written, fully performed and expired employment agreement, since
the covenants were only applicable if the employee terminated em-
ployment during the life of the contract.21 5 Florida clearly does not
prohibit the enforcement of non-competes following the expiration of
a term contract as a per se rule, but the issue is one of contract draft-
ing and whether the covenant not to compete clearly takes effect upon
expiration of the contract.2 16
209. Id.
210. The Daniel Boone Clinic, P.S.C. v. Dahhan, 734 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987); see
also Robert S. Weiss & Assocs., Inc. v. Wiederlight, 546 A.2d 216, 222 (Conn. 1988) (upholding
enforcement of non-compete after lapse of four-year employment term contract which was not
renewed by employer, on grounds that "terminated" includes "lapse or expiration"); cf. Volun-
teer Firemen's Ins. Servs., Inc. v. CIGNA Prop. & Cas. Ins. Agency, 693 A.2d 1330, 1339-40 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1997) (upholding restrictive covenants in agreement between distributor of insurance
services and underwriter when distributor gave intent not to renew "rollover" term contract;
finding that "termination" included "expiration" of contract term); Carvel Corp. v. Eisenberg,
692 F. Supp. 182, 184-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (upholding non-compete clause in licensing agreement
on same grounds).
211. Brenner v. Barco Chem. Div., Inc., 209 So. 2d 277, 278 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
212. Id.
213. Sanz v. R.T. Aerospace Corp., 650 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
214. Storz Broad. Co. v. Courtney, 178 So. 2d 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965), cert. denied, 188
So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1966).
215. Sanz, 650 So. 2d at 1059; Courtney, 178 So. 2d at 42.
216. See also Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d 1161, 1165 n.2 (N.J. 1978) (agreeing with state
appellate court that post-employment restrictive covenant was not terminated by expiration of
contract).
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d. Analysis
The enforceability of non-competition clauses in expired term con-
tracts has become one of judicial contract construction. If courts con-
tinue to analyze cases in this manner, Florida's approach, which
requires 'expiration' to be articulated conspicuously in the contract, is
the most logical because it provides the employee with notice of what
events will trigger the covenant. From a reasonableness standpoint, it
makes far greater sense for courts to analyze which party declined to
renew the term contract. Logically, the employee wanted to keep
working, but the employer chose not to renew the agreement, this
should be equated to termination without cause and regarded as a
factor strongly favoring the employee in a balancing the equities in-
quiry. Such an analysis would have changed the outcome in The
Daniel Boone Clinic, since the employer elected not to renew the roll-
over term contract. On the other hand, if the employee gave the em-
ployer notice of his intent not to renew the term contract, this would
be more akin to a voluntary resignation, particularly if the employee
had, in the past, renewed the contract as a matter of course.
A second, but more tenuous, argument that the employee may have
concerns the ancillarity doctrine. If an employment contract lapses or
expires, then a covenant not to compete purporting to take effect
upon expiration of the agreement could be considered as not ancillary
to a valid transaction. Put another way, a court may consider that a
covenant amounts to a "naked" covenant, or an outright restraint of
trade, which is per se invalid. 217 If both parties to a term contract
bargain for a definite end of the employment relationship, then a non-
compete that takes effect after a predetermined end to the contract is
not ancillary to a valid relationship or transaction. Conversely, in the
at-will setting, neither party bargains for a definite end to the employ-
ment relationship, and the restrictive covenant is intended to protect
the employer from a premature, not predestined, end to the relation-
ship. Apparently, no court has addressed the ancillarity doctrine in
this context.
2. Constructive Discharge
A claim of constructive discharge normally arises out of an employ-
ment discrimination or harassment case. In such cases, the employee
charges that her former employer behaved in a manner that made the
work environment so intolerable or unbearable that she had no choice
217. Central Water Works Supply, Inc. v. Fisher, 608 N.E.2d 618, 625 (I11. App. Ct. 1993)
(Cook, J., specially concurring).
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but to quit - that in effect, she was discharged.2 18 Quite simply, if an
employee proves that she was constructively terminated, the separa-
tion is a 'hybrid' termination-resignation and most likely a termination
without cause. In certain states, such as New York and Illinois, the
classification of a termination as one without cause can be outcome-
determinative and effectively void a non-compete.
a. The Curious Alliance Metals Decision
Due to the fact that most terminations are easily classified as resig-
nations or terminations, this issue has not appeared with great fre-
quency in reported decisions concerning restrictive covenants.
However, the issue of constructive discharge was prevalent in Alliance
Metals, Inc. of Atlanta v. Hinely Indus., Inc.2 19 In the Alliance Metals
case, Hinely had a five-year employment contract, which included a
two-year non-compete provision, to serve as President of a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Alliance Metals.220 Hinely became disenchanted
with his employment almost immediately.221 During the first year of
his employment, Hinely did not receive any incentive compensation,
due to the company's alleged poor financial performance, and he sus-
pected that his superiors at the parent company had manipulated the
books to deny him such compensation.22 2 Hinely also suspected that
the chairman of the parent company was engaged in a price-fixing
scheme with a competitor.22 3 Hinely began cooperating with the De-
partment of Justice and, shortly thereafter, was stripped of his day-to-
day duties at the company.224 Ten days after Hinely was effectively
put on paid leave, the chairman of the parent company admitted to
violating the Sherman Act, thereby confirming Hinely's suspicions. 225
Hinely then formally resigned from Alliance Metals, stating that the
company's actions had, in effect, amounted to a "constructive dis-
charge" of his term contract. 226 Hinely immediately incorporated his
own competing entity, and Alliance Metals sued him for, inter alia,
breach of the employment contract. 227
218. See Rosado v. Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119 (1st Cir. 1977) (setting forth constructive dis-
charge standard); Green v. Indus. Specialty Contractors, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 126, 134 (Tex. Ct. App.
1999) (same).
219. Alliance Metals, Inc. of Atlanta v. Hinely Indus., Inc., 222 F.3d 895 (11th Cir. 2000).
220. Id. at 897.
221. Id. at 898.
222. Id.
223. Alliance Metals, 222 F.3d at 898.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Alliance Metals, 222 F.3d at 899.
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Hinely defended the lawsuit on the grounds that he was construc-
tively discharged, and that the non-compete was void, by its own
terms, because Alliance had effectively terminated him without
cause.228 The court examined the language in Hinely's contract, which
provided that the restrictive covenant:
[Sihall be null and void in the event Employee is terminated by Em-
ployer without cause or if the Employer materially breaches the
terms of this agreement and fails to cure any such material breach
within thirty (30) days after notice from the Employee specifying
the breach and requiring it to be cured. 229
The contract also provided for the application of Pennsylvania law,
which, given the holding in Brobston, would seemingly permit Hinely
to void the non-compete if he could prove his constructive discharge
claim at trial. However, the court held that Hinely's allegations of
constructive discharge would not, even if proven, constitute a termina-
tion by the Employer without cause, so as to render the non-compete
null and void.230
The Alliance Metals court's reasoning strains credulity in light of the
fact that Pennsylvania law applied to Hinely's restrictive covenant.
First, the court simply could have held that Hinely failed to comply
with the 'notice and opportunity to cure breach' provision of the con-
tract and declined to address the constructive discharge issue.23' Sec-
ond, the court could have affirmed the district court's decision on the
grounds that Hinely failed to meet the rigorous standard of proving
constructive discharge, which required him to produce enough evi-
dence "from which a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that his
working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person in his
position would be compelled to resign. '2 32 Instead, the court chose to
examine the question of whether a constructive discharge constituted
a termination without cause. The court placed significant value on the
words "by employer" in the non-compete provision.233 According to
the Eleventh Circuit, this language "contemplate[d] a conscious
choice by Alliance Atlanta to terminate Hinely without cause in order
to free him of his contractual duty not to compete. '234 The key words
"by employer" before "without cause" foreclosed an "unintentional
invalidation of the non-competition provision that could result from a
228. Id. at 899-900.
229. Id. at 902 (emphasis added).
230. Id. at 903.
231. Alliance Metals, 222 F.3d at 903.
232. Highhouse v. Avery Transp., 660 A.2d 1374, 1376 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
233. Alliance Metals, 222 F.3d at 902.
234. Id.
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constructive discharge. 2 35 Accordingly, Hinely could not equate con-
structive discharge with termination "by [the] employer" without
cause.
236
In light of Brobston, which raises a strong presumption against the
enforceability of a non-compete in a termination case, 237 the Alliance
Metals case produced a strange outcome, to say the least. For exam-
ple, the court never even cited Brobston or analogized a constructive
discharge to a termination without cause. Although the parameters of
the Brobston holding are not well-defined, that case does state clearly
that it should make no difference whether there is specific contractual
language allowing an employer to enforce a restrictive covenant in a
discharge case.238 In fact, the employment contract at issue in the
Brobston case, similar to most employment contracts, provides that
the non-compete is enforceable "[o]n the termination of Employee's
employment for whatever reason .. .",239 According to the Alliance
Metals court, the relevant inquiry is not the reasonableness of enforc-
ing a restrictive covenant against a discharged worker; rather the sole
inquiry is the contract's language and whether it allows for enforce-
ment in such as case.240 If the court explored the enforceability of the
covenant under Brobston, and if Hinely were able to prove that he
was constructively discharged, Hinely most likely could have voided
the non-compete. It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile Alliance
Metals with Brobston; perhaps the Eleventh Circuit thought it was ap-
plying Florida law.
b. The Narrow Contract Reading in Key Temporary Personnel
The Oklahoma appellate court reached a similar result in Key Tem-
porary Personnel, Inc. v. Cox.241 In the Cox case, the court held that
an employee's claim of "constructive discharge" was not a defense to
the enforceability of a customer non-solicitation clause.242 The court
chose to rely on a strict contract construction approach, rather than
analyzing the case under an overall requirement of reasonableness. In
Cox, the employee's non-solicitation clause took effect if her employ-
ment ceased for any reason, without regard for the nature of her ter-
mination or even whether a breach of the agreement caused the end
235. Id.
236. Id. at 903.
237. See supra, Section III.A.2.a.
238. Insulation Corp. of Am. v. Brobston, 667 A.2d 729, 731-32 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
239. Id. at 731-32 (emphasis added).
240. Alliance Metals, 222 F.3d at 902.
241. Key Temp. Personnel, Inc. v. Cox, 884 P.2d 1213 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994).
242. Id. at 1217.
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of the employment relationship. In rejecting Cox's defense, the court
placed emphasis on the fact that, "it was Cox herself, that [sic] termi-
nated her employment with Key. '243 Additionally, the court empha-
sized that Cox could not point to any contractual language that would
allow her to escape the non-solicitation restriction if the work condi-
tions were intolerable. 244 The court gave no credence to the fact that
a constructive discharge is akin to a termination without cause, or that
fairness and reasonableness may militate against enforcement of the
restrictive covenant in such cases.2 45
c. Analysis
Viewing Alliance Metals as an anomaly, and Cox as simply a poorly
reasoned decision, the constructive discharge analysis should almost
always parallel the termination without cause analysis. If a state's re-
strictive covenant law provides that a termination without cause voids
a non-compete, then an employee's claim that he was constructively
discharged should give him an opportunity to void the non-compete
clause. 246 A case following this approach is International Business
Machines Corp. v. Martson.2 47 In that case, which addressed an em-
ployee's forfeiture of benefits for violating a restrictive covenant, a
federal district court in New York granted an employee leave to
amend his answer so that he could raise the issue of constructive dis-
charge in his efforts to avoid the covenant not to compete.248 The
court recognized that, under New York law, a termination without
cause automatically voids a non-compete clause, and that constructive
discharge is for all intents and purposes a termination without
cause.
249
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. The decision is also somewhat unusual since Oklahoma is a pro-employee state, and the
governing statute permits non-competition clauses in only two circumstances: sale of goodwill
and dissolution of a partnership. See Loewen Group Acquisition Corp. v. Matthews, 12 P.3d
977, 980 (Okla. Ct. App. 2000) (voiding covenant not to compete in connection with business
purchase; citing two statutory exceptions to prohibition on restraints of trade).
246. Cf. Tennyson v. Sch. Dist of Menomonie Area., 606 N.W.2d 594, 602 (Wis. Ct. App.
1999) (employee had claim for breach of contract, which employer could only terminate "for
cause,"; constructively discharged); Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88, 95-96 (Tenn. 1999)
(employer breached employment contract providing that executive could be terminated only
"for cause" when it removed duties and constructively discharged him); Turner v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022, 1030 (Cal. 1994) (stating that "[a]n employee may prove ... that a
constructive discharge is a breach of an express or implied contract of employment.").
247. International Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Martson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
248. Id. at 619-21.
249. Post v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 358, 360-61 (N.Y. 1979).
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3. Assignment of Contract to New Employer
Many employees accept positions with companies based on their
relationship with, and regard for, a management team that is in place
at the time of hiring. Indeed, most employees devote little thought to
succession planning and whether current management is looking to
sell the business to a new owner. When a business is sold, however,
the employee and acquiring corporation may have different expecta-
tions with respect to workforce stability. First, the employee may be-
lieve, especially in a closely-held company, that a sale of the business
fundamentally alters the nature of the employment relationship, so
that it is reasonable for her to examine other competitive job opportu-
nities. Second, the acquiring corporation likely has conducted due dil-
igence to determine whether the current sales or information
technology staff is bound by restrictive covenants. The presence of
strong covenants not to compete can dramatically affect the goodwill
component of a business and can help ensure that new management
will have a strong staff of key employees to effectuate the transition.
This tension is almost always resolved in the acquiring corporation's
favor. Most well-drafted employment contracts contain an assignabil-
ity clause, which permits an employer to assign a restrictive covenant
in a business sale. The general rule is that, if a contract expressly per-
mits a party to assign its rights under the contract, the assignee (the
acquiring corporation) may enforce the agreement and any restrictive
covenants contained therein. 250
In the absence of an assignability clause, the authorities are split.
Virtually all jurisdictions, including the employee-friendly states of Il-
linois and New York, have held that an assignment of a restrictive
covenant to an acquiring corporation is permissible in the absence of a
governing contractual clause.2 51 However, Pennsylvania has held that,
absent a specific contractual provision, restrictive covenants are not
assignable to an acquiring corporation. 252
250. Barnes Group, Inc. v. Reinhart, No. TH 00-311-CTH, 2001 WL 301433 at *21 (S.D. Ind.
Feb. 26, 2001); Hamer Holding Group, Inc. v. Elmore, 560 N.E.2d 907, 913 (I11. App. Ct. 1990).
251. AutoMed Techs., Inc. v. Eller, 160 F. Supp. 2d 915, 923-24 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Artromick
Int'l, Inc. v. Koch, 759 N.E.2d 385, 386-88 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001); Managed Health Care Assocs.,
Inc. v. Kethan, 209 F.3d 923, 929 (6th Cir. 2000); J. H. Renarde, Inc. v. Sims, 711 A.2d 410, 413
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998); Hexacomb Corp. v. GTW Enters., 875 F. Supp. 457, 464 (N.D.
Ill. 1993); Herring Gas Co., Inc. v. Whiddon, 616 So. 2d 892, 896-97 (Miss. 1993); Special Prods.
Mfg., Inc. v. Douglass, 553 N.Y.S.2d 506, 509 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); Saliterman v. Finney, 361
N.W.2d 175, 178 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
252. Siemens Med. Solutions Health Servs. Corp. v. Carmelengo, 167 F. Supp. 2d 752, 757-58
(E.D. Pa. 2001).
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If an employee is genuinely concerned about a management buy-
out, he can always attempt to contract around the assignability clause
by providing that a change of control will relieve him from the restric-
tive covenant. However, many employers realize that the goodwill
value of the business, and concomitantly, the purchase price, will be
significantly reduced if there is a threat of post-employment competi-
tion and customer raiding by key employees. Therefore, unless a val-
ued prospective employee has true bargaining power, it is unlikely
that he will be able to contract around assignability.
IV. PRACTICAL ADVICE FOR AVOIDING LEGAL DISPUTES
Given the myriad rules and tests that courts have employed in dis-
charge cases, it is far more efficient for the employer and employee to
address the enforceability of a restrictive covenant in the event of in-
voluntary termination through a clear, well-drafted agreement. The
ideal approach to define the parties' rights, obligations, and more im-
portantly, avoid litigation, is to draft an employment agreement that
addresses the enforceability of a covenant upon termination. Alterna-
tively, if the employer seeks to discharge the employee, but fails to
secure a non-compete, or the employment contract does not specifi-
cally address involuntary discharge with respect to the covenant, then
the parties should provide for a brand new covenant, if desired, in a
separation agreement.
A. Addressing Involuntary Termination in the
Employment Agreement
Most employment agreements fail to make a distinction as to how a
restrictive covenant is to operate when the employee is discharged,
whether for cause or without cause. Instead, most contracts place res-
ignation and termination for any reason together in one governing
clause. The fundamental problem with this approach is that a court
may invalidate the covenant in a case where the employee is termi-
nated, regardless of how well the company lawyer drafts the contract.
Perhaps the reason that so many covenants fail to differentiate be-
tween resignation, termination for cause, and termination without
cause, is that an employee is rarely given the opportunity to suggest
changes or modifications to the employment contract. The contracts
are essentially take-it-or-leave-it documents distributed to all employ-
ees that the company seeks to bind to some form of post-employment
restriction.
These 'employer-friendly' agreements, however, may not protect
the employer's interests and may lead to judicial invalidation of the
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contract. Given the reluctance of many courts to enforce non-compe-
tition provisions in involuntary discharge cases, an employer should
address the issue specifically in an employment contract. The follow-
ing steps, if adhered to, can provide an employer and employee with a
clear understanding of the interplay between the employment separa-
tion and the enforcement of restrictive covenants, give the parties
flexibility in the event a separation does in fact occur and, perhaps
most importantly, survive judicial scrutiny.
1. Step 1 - Define "Termination for Cause"
The first step in drafting an effective restrictive covenant provision
is to separate terminations for cause from those without cause.
Rather than relying on a judicial construction of what 'cause' should
encompass, it should be clearly defined in the contract. For instance, a
contract could include the following provisions:
Sec. 1. Under this Agreement, "cause" shall be defined as follows:
(a) conviction of, or plea of nolo contendre, to a felony or other
crime involving moral turpitude; (b) fraud, material dishonesty, em-
bezzlement, or other material misappropriation of property by the
Employee; (c) willful neglect of a defined duty or malfeasance; (d)
willful failure to comply with the provisions of this Agreement, in-
cluding [section defining job duties]; or (e) willful failure to comply
with the reasonable and lawful instructions of the Board of
Directors.253
Sec. 2. If the Company terminates the employee for "cause," as
defined herein, the Company must: (a) provide written notice to the
Employee that the termination is for "cause," setting forth in rea-
sonable detail the nature of such "cause"; and (b) if "cause" is for a
reason set forth in Section 1(c), (d) or (e), give the Employee a
reasonable opportunity to cure the asserted non-compliance or fail-
ure to perform, unless the Company determines in good faith that it
would be futile to provide the Employee with such opportunity to
cure.
The failure of an employer to give an employee notice would consti-
tute an admission that the employee was terminated without cause.
This may lead to unanticipated consequences, such as the triggering of
rights to a company severance plan or unemployment compensation.
Therefore, the employer must give proper notice of a termination for
cause. If the reason for cause were a failure to perform a duty under
the contract, then it would be in the best interests of all involved par-
ties if the employee were able to cure the deficiency. However, an
employer may claim that an opportunity to cure was futile and was
253. Depending on the contract and the employee's position in the company, other reasons
may be delineated specifically.
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therefore not warranted if the employee had repeatedly breached his
duties in the past or if the breach was so severe as to impair company
goodwill, destroy a client relationship, or otherwise constitute serious
insubordination.
2. Step 2 - Equate Termination for Cause with Resignation
The next step is to draft a restrictive covenant that is triggered by a
voluntary resignation and a termination for cause. A sample of an
effective non-competition provision is the following:
Sec. 3. In the event the Employee voluntarily resigns his employ-
ment with the Company or is terminated by the Company for
"cause," as defined in Section 1, Employee covenants that he will
not, directly or indirectly, whether as a principal or as a director,
officer, employee, independent contractor, agent, partner, or stock-
holder to another entity (other than by the ownership of a passive
investment interest of not more than 2.5% in a company with pub-
licly traded securities), render any [define nature of services to be
restricted, e.g., medical, accounting] services to any person or entity
within the Restricted Area for a period of one (1) year from the
date of such resignation or termination ("the Noncompetition
Term"). For purposes of this Section 3, "Restricted Area" is de-
fined as [define desired geographical restriction].
3. Step 3 - Provide for a Restrictive Covenant in the Event of
Termination Without Cause
The third, and most important, step is to set forth what will happen
with respect to a restrictive covenant when an employee is discharged
without cause. The vast majority of employment contracts ignores this
step and, instead, groups all employment separations together, which
could lead to judicial invalidation of a restrictive covenant if the termi-
nation was not for good cause. Using these model provisions, any ter-
mination that does not meet the definition of 'cause,' or for which no
notice was provided to the employee, will be interpreted as without
cause. To secure the validity of a non-compete clause in the event of a
termination without cause, the following three sections should be in-
cluded in the contract:
Sec. 4. In the event the Employee is terminated by the Company
without cause, Employee covenants that he will not, directly or indi-
rectly, whether as a principal or as a director, officer, employee, in-
dependent contractor, agent, partner, or stockholder to another
entity (other than by the ownership of a passive investment interest
of not more than 2.5% in a company with publicly traded securi-
ties), render any [define nature of services to be restricted, e.g.,
medical, accounting] services to any person or entity within the Re-
stricted Area (as defined above) for a period of one (1) year from
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
the date of such termination. This Section 4 is subject to the provi-
sions of Sections 5 and 6.
Sec. 5. The Company may elect, in its sole discretion, to enforce the
provisions of Section 4 herein, provided that, if the Company so
elects, following the date of the Employee's termination without
cause, the Company shall, during the Noncompetition Term: (i) no-
tify the Employee in writing within three (3) days of the effective
date of termination of its election to enforce the provisions of Sec-
tion 4; (ii) pay the Employee 50% of the Employee's base salary in
monthly installments, at the rate existing as of the date of his termi-
nation; and (iii) provide the Employee with the same health insur-
ance and life insurance benefits that he was receiving as of the date
of his termination, with no cost to the Employee.
Sec. 6. In the event the Company elects to cease making payments
and benefits to the Employee under Section 5 at any time during
the Noncompetition Term, it shall provide the Employee notice of
such election and the last date on which the Employee will receive
payments and benefits under Section 5 ("the Termination of Pay-
ments Date"). The Company must provide such notice in writing at
least thirty (30) days in advance of the Termination of Payments
Date. If the Company makes such an election and provides the Em-
ployee with such notice, the Employee's obligations under Section 4
shall cease on the Termination of Payments Date, and the Noncom-
petition Term shall expire.
4. Analysis
Now that the employer has a contract that differentiates between a
termination with cause and one without cause, while allowing it to
enforce a restrictive covenant in both cases, will the covenant be en-
forced? In Markovits v. Venture Info Capital, Inc.,254 the subject em-
ployment agreement contained variations of the provisions as set forth
above. The court, applying Massachusetts's law, upheld the covenant
as reasonable when the employee was terminated without cause.2 5
The court reasoned that the employment agreement and a stock
agreement, under which the company had bought back Markovits'
stock, were "designed in such a manner that a former employee will
be financially supported regardless of the manner of his
termination."2 56
Although the stock buy-back was a significant financial boon to
Markovits, the court did not analyze any other factors with respect to
his termination and did not condition its finding of reasonableness on
the stock buy-back. If an employer uses a model contract such as that
254. Markovits v. Venture Info. Capital, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 647 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
255. Id. at 660.
256. Id.
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described above, and similar to that addressed in Venture Info Capital,
the amount of consideration to be provided to an employee in the
event of termination without cause will undoubtedly vary from case to
case. Assuming the employer and employee engage in good faith ne-
gotiations, the amount of required consideration will depend on the
likelihood that the employee can find work in another industry until
his non-compete expires, whether he must relocate to another geo-
graphic area to find comparable employment, and the degree to which
the employee can impair goodwill and customer relationships if he
were to leave and compete. In the final analysis, the fact that the par-
ties bargain for continued benefits after termination is a clear indica-
tor of reasonableness and will most likely allow a court to uphold the
covenant. If is critical that the employer and employee bargain be-
forehand for a form of automatic severance that is tied to a restrictive
covenant. Using this flexible approach, the employer has the option
either to enforce the covenant or let the employee compete and re-
ceive nothing upon discharge. Most importantly, this bargaining pro-
cess will help avoid costly, unpredictable litigation.
B. Negotiating the Separation Agreement
In the vast majority of cases where an employer and employee have
failed to agree beforehand to a termination contingency, the parties
are still left with an option more palatable than litigation: including
the restrictive covenant in the separation agreement. This approach
does give the parties some flexibility. For instance, payments in ex-
change for a restrictive covenant can be spread out over periods of
time to maximize the tax benefits to the employee without harming
the employer; the employer can create a combination of other bene-
fits, such as covering the cost of COBRA for a period of time, vesting
or granting certain stock options, or providing outplacement services,
among a host of alternatives. This may allow the parties to consider
an employee's unique circumstances, which may not be predictable at
the time the employer and employee begin an employment relation-
ship. Accordingly, the employer must provide the employee with con-
sideration for the covenant, something to which he is not already
entitled upon severance, such as payment under an ERISA-based sev-
erance plan or accrued, but unpaid, bonuses.
Clearly, a restrictive covenant entered into between the parties as
part of a settlement or separation agreement satisfies the ancillarity
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requirement.25 7 In fact, as the Supreme Court of Texas noted in Justin
Belt Co., Inc. v. Yost, not only is it ancillary to a valid contract, but is
also "ancillary to an agreement highly favored by the courts. ' 258 To
this end, the reasonableness of the covenant should be subject to a less
exacting degree of scrutiny. From the employer's perspective, the
downside of negotiating a restrictive covenant as part of a separation
agreement is uncertainty. Presumably, the employer is concerned
about post-employment competition, but there is no way of telling
what a disgruntled employee, or his lawyer, is going to seek for the
non-compete, particularly if he has a viable claim for discrimination or
wrongful discharge. A company's 'low-ball' offer may invite a threat
of litigation by the employee. If the former employee has another
competitive opportunity lined up, he can always pursue a declaratory
judgment action to determine whether the covenant contained in his
employment contract is void in light of the involuntary discharge.
The major problem from the employee's perspective is the absence
of leverage after termination. The employee will most likely want to
complete a deal quickly, in the hopes of securing some payment, or
insurance coverage, to tide him over until he can find new work.
Moreover, if the former employee calls the employer's bluff and seeks
to compete on his own, he runs the risk of getting sued by the em-
ployer for violating the covenant, a claim that may or may not have
merit. Very few jurisdictions have any predictable rules, and the em-
ployer may determine that its trade secrets, customer relationships
and goodwill are valuable enough to try and protect through litigation.
An employee could face a challenge even if he never executed a
restrictive covenant while employed.2 59 Of course, a court will not use
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to create what
amounts to an ex post facto non-compete or non-solicit clause.260
However, the employer could pursue a trade secrets claim, arguing
that the employee's new position will inevitably lead to the disclosure
257. See Justin Belt Co., Inc. v. Yost, 502 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Tex. 1973) (upholding restrictive
covenant in settlement agreement).
258. Id.
259. See Long v. Atlantic PBS, Inc., 681 A.2d 249, 253 (R.I. 1996) (stating that "absent any
enforceable noncompetition agreement, former employees . . . can solicit their previous em-
ployer's customers for business, as long as, in doing so, they are not acting tortiously, for exam-
ple, by interfering unjustifiably with their former employer's contracts, by misappropriating the
employer's trade secrets, or by converting other confidential business information belonging to
their former employer.") (emphasis added).
260. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Sempetrean, 525 N.E.2d 1016, 1021 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)
(holding that absent a restrictive covenant or some badge of fraud, a former employee may
compete with his former employer and solicit former customers without breaching any implied
covenants of good faith).
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of trade secrets that the employee has previously learned. 261 While
the law is relatively undeveloped with respect to "inevitable disclo-
sure" in the context of employees who do not operate under non-com-
petition clauses, the trend appears to disapprove of such a theory, so
that the employee is allowed to engage in post-employment competi-
tion.262 Courts have made it clear that the "umbrella of trade secret
protection should not be deployed to suppress legitimate competi-
tion," so an employer must consider what the actual threat really is
before pursuing the employee on this basis.263 For example, if the em-
ployer pursues a trade secrets claim in bad faith to dissuade the em-
ployee from competing, it may be liable to the employee for his
attorneys' fees in defending such a suit.264 Nevertheless, an employer
could sue a former employee for tortious interference with contract if
he attempts to solicit business from customers of the company.265
While the law does afford a competitor a qualified privilege to com-
pete in the relevant marketplace, a departed employee still cannot use
wrongful means to compete with his former employer.266 Some em-
ployers attempt to dissuade prospective employers from dealing with
the discharged worker by informing them that the employee is subject
to a non-compete agreement, and that the new employer may be 1ia-
261. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying inevitable
disclosure of trade secrets doctrine even when employee never signed non-compete covenant);
Matthew K. Miller, Note, Inevitable Disclosure Where No Non-Competition Agreement Exists:
Additional Guidance Is Needed, 6 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 9, 38-49 (Spring 2000) (discussing the
doctrine of inevitable disclosure as well as its application where employee has no non-compete
covenant).
262. See Complete Bus. Solutions, Inc. v. Mauro, No. 01 C 0363, 2001 WL 290196 at *5 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 16, 2001) (stating that in "cases that have successfully applied the 'inevitable disclosure'
doctrine, the employee had agreed that he would not compete with his former employer for a
fixed period of time...").
263. 3M Co. v. Pribyl, 259 F.3d 587, 595 n.2 (7th Cir. 2001); cf Zep Mfg. Co. v. Harthcock, 824
S.W.2d 654, 663-64 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (action against new employer for tortuous interference
with contract cannot be predicated on underlying non-compete that is invalid).
264. See Telephone Mgmt. Corp. v. Gillette, No. CV 99-1338-KI, 2001 WL 210179, at *3 (D.
Or. Feb. 20, 2001) (awarding attorneys' fees to fired employee in trade secret litigation when
company brought claim in bad faith and could not articulate what trade secrets ex-employee had
misappropriated).
265. Cf. Harthcock, 824 S.W.2d at 663-64 (discussing that tortuous interference with contract
claim requires an employer to prove: (1) a contract; (2) a willful and intentional act that inter-
feres with the contract and was calculated to cause damage to the employer; and (3) actual
damages).
266. See Times Herald Co. v. A.H. Belo Corp., 820 S.W.2d 206, 215 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991)
(noting that a party may cause a customer to terminate a terminable-at-will contract with the
competitor and may obtain the future benefits for the party's own competitive advantage by
offering better contract terms or a higher price); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: COMPETI-
TION AS PROPER OR IMPROPER INTERFERENCE § 768 (1979) (setting forth elements of competi-
tor's privilege).
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ble for tortious interference with contract, or prospective advantage, if
they enable the departed employee to solicit new business.2 67 How-
ever, former employers cannot blithely assert that a departed em-
ployee is bound by a restrictive covenant, if he in fact is not, and may
be subject to an injunction prohibiting such misleading
representations. 268
The very fact that an employee has been terminated, in conjunction
with his attempts or threats to compete with his former employer, may
make negotiating a separation agreement contentious and difficult.
As set forth above, myriad issues arise regarding post-employment
competition, even when no clear restrictive covenant is at issue. Liti-
gation, or at the very least threats of litigation, may parallel discus-
sions surrounding the separation document. To be sure, this usually is
not an environment that invites a fair, evenhanded resolution. While
executing a restrictive covenant as part of a separation agreement may
be more attractive than litigating the enforceability of a previously-
executed covenant in an employment agreement, this approach is
fraught with uncertainty and is not nearly as effective as addressing
the enforceability of the covenant in the employment contract.
V. CONCLUSION
In examining covenants not to compete in the context of an invol-
untary termination, courts should employ a balancing of the equities
approach to give consideration to the nature of the discharge in con-
junction with all other relevant factors. For cause/without cause dis-
tinctions and categorical rules are inflexible, and their application
inevitably leads the parties into a collateral dispute as to a discharged
employee's work history. The involuntary termination cases analyzed
herein have yielded some bizarre results and poorly reasoned opin-
ions. Employers and their attorneys should seek to avoid these dis-
putes, since it is unpredictable how a court might ultimately rule, or
even what analysis it might apply. The soundest approach is to pro-
vide, at the inception of the employment relationship, what happens
to a restrictive covenant when the employee is fired. If drafted prop-
erly, the employment contract can give the company an option to en-
267. See Automated Concepts Inc. v. Weaver, No. 99 C 7599, 2000 WL 1134541 at *5-7 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 9, 2000) (finding that former employer stated a tortious interference with contract claim
against new employer relating to employee non-compete agreement).
268. See Amalgamated Acme Affiliates, Inc. v. Minton, 33 S.W.3d 387, 392-96 (Tex. Ct. App.
2000) (affirming trial court's entry of temporary restraining order barring former employer from
falsely asserting that departed employee was subject to non-compete agreement; constitutional
prohibition against "prior restraints" on speech not applicable to false and deceptive business
practices).
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force the restrictive covenant in exchange for severance, or simply let
the employee walk away free and clear. While certainly more equita-
ble from the terminated employee's perspective, this approach gives
the employer the opportunity to assess and quantify the competitive
threat posed by the discharged worker without committing itself to a
particular course of action.
